

THE STATE-PHYSICIAN.

SIR,—In the course of my reading Mr. Osborne's excellent work "on the Duties of a Man," I was struck with the following passages in the chapter which relates to the duty of the physician. "Let him not (says Mr. G.) endeavour directly or indirectly to raise himself to be more highly esteemed, on the testimony of his own conscience will justify; nor invidiously abuse the character, and sap the credit of a rival. Let him guard against all affectation of courtesies, all assumed and delusive softness of manners; let him not become a supple, fawning, and servile attendant on the great: ready at all times, like theameleon, to take the colour of surrounding objects."—Again, "He will be the first in critical or uncommon circumstances to suggest the propriety of calling in additional aid. He will not indulge a lurking wish to persevere in a dubious or unsuccessful system of medical treatment, from the apprehension, that a change will argue ignorance in himself, or wound to the credit of another person, who may have suggested it." As our ideas, Mr. Cobbett, are bound together by association, my thoughts were irresistibly directed towards our political Doctor, who at present assumes the authority of feeling the pulse of the United Kingdom, and prognosticating as to our security or danger; and to whose sagacity and discretion, the power is entrusted of drawing the blood from our veins, and the money from our pockets, according to what appears to him to be the exigency of our case.—If the truth of the above recited maxims of the moralist, as applied to the physician, depend on the mischief or good which he may do to individual patients from regarding or following them; if it rest on the responsibility of his situation; if a tremendous weight of obligation to guard these salutary warnings is heaped on the man, who has taken upon himself the care and the cure of the aggregate body of individuals who compose this nation, who are ever in filling that station which constitutes him responsible for the security of Englishmen in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties, and for their deliverance from evils, with which, in the present crisis, they are threatened; evils, which Englishmen must deem to be infinitely worse than death itself! Every person, Mr. Cobbett,

who loves his country, has a right to propose this question: does Mr. Addington possess those qualifications which, as an honest man, he pledges himself that he does possess, by accepting and retaining the office, which he fills? And for the failure in which, the public would be justified (to use the lawyer's phrase) in bringing their "action of assumpsit" against him. The Doctor may say that he is sensible of his responsibility, and that he is ready to abide the consequences of it. But if, through his incapacity, we are brought into dangers, from which we cannot be extricated, it will be of little consolation or advantage to us, that he has been impeached, that he has lost his place, or even his head: we may have been hurried by his want of wisdom and foresight, into utter ruin, which may preclude even the benefit of his example from being extended to us. The hon. Henry Addington may, in consequence of his own weakness and folly, be the last, as well as the least of our prime ministers.—That Mr. A. is wretchedly deficient in the qualifications essential to his situation, and which we have a right to expect in him, is a fact so evident, and so notorious, that I think, that it would be a waste of time were I to enter into a formal proof of it, by minutely comparing what he has done, with what he has left undone. That I may not, however, be accused of absolute silence on this head, I shall mention two prominent instances of his incapacity, which must be as obvious to the lowest farmer in every parish, as they are to the sage and solemn stock-holder, who shakes his head over the Newspaper at Lloyd's. My instances shall be taken from the Doctor's plans of finance, and his plans of defence in this our momentous struggle with the enemy, "who would swallow us up quick." First then, as to finance. And here I shall not draw out a long line of figures, and set the rules of addition and subtraction to work, neither shall I give the Doctor an opportunity of shuffling as to the time when his accounts begin, and when they are closed, nor of plundering one year to patch up another. What I shall mention is grounded upon facts universally known, and of which every person is competent to judge. In the first place then, I refer to the mode of raising supplies, which the Doctor has prescribed unto us in that voluminous and complicated Act called the Property, Profit, or Income

Act; which, Mr. Cobbett, seems to be in our Statute Book what the "Mithridate" is in our dispensatories, which consists of five and forty ingredients, and after all is fit for nothing. This Act has been constructed upon principles so beautifully and delicately *theoretical*, that it cannot bear the rude hand of *practice*. And it is at last discovered, that the strict law, in spite of the arbitrary interpretations of the self-appointed legislators, at the Tax-Office, is incapable of being carried into execution. And, if I am informed rightly, no *regular or legal* assessment has hitherto been made under it. So, Mr. Cobbett, through the mighty cleverness of the Doctor, we shall have a whole year's Income-Tax to pay at once in one round sum. And there is reason to fear, that the collectors will find even more difficulty in collecting these round sums, than the commissioners experienced in discovering the meaning of the law by which those sums were to be levied. Here I think, that the Doctor has failed in making his specific medicine palatable. He has not gilded his pill at all for us. So much for *finance*. Now for a few words as to *defence*. Rumours upon rumours have been coming thick upon us, like the leaves in autumn, for a considerable time, of the certain and speedy attempt of our desperate enemy upon our coasts. And yet, strange to tell, after so much deliberation, and talking "about it and about it," the final regulations respecting the volunteer-corps, on which force the Doctor has informed us we must chiefly depend for our security, are not as yet passed into a law. And, after that the Act shall have passed, I doubt not, Mr. Cobbett, but that we shall still have many "more last words" upon the subject. Now, I think, that it does not require very keen penetration to discover that the Doctor has been *slow*, in these two important instances, I wish that we may find him *sure*. There is one circumstance which makes these instances of incapacity infinitely more glaring and inexcusable; and, it is this, that the Doctor had the start of us by many months, as to the knowledge of our real situation. Whilst we, poor easy souls, were flattering ourselves that we were in "profound peace," and likely to continue so, the Doctor and Co. were carrying on their far-famed correspondence with their new friends across the Channel. And had they possessed that portion of sagacity, which falls to the lot of nine-tenths of his Majesty's subjects, they had the means before them of being certified, that war was at no great distance. What, Mr. Cobbett, would a real statesman have done in a similar situation?

Instead of suffering a selfish pusillanimity to beguile him, instead of allowing himself to believe what he wished, he would at once have looked forward, with dignified composure to the worst, and bent all the energy and the resources of his mind to one point; viz. how he might enable his country to meet the worst with dignity and honour. He would have set himself to work with promptitude and vigour, so that at a future day he might be able to come forward prepared with measures matured by sober reflection and practical inquiry, applicable at once to the probable exigencies of his country, and the known spirit and temper of his countrymen. Our provident Premier, in this important interval, does not seem to have "laid down" even the "keel or ribs" of any salutary measure, he seems to have had nothing "upon the stocks." No; he found himself sufficiently encumbered, and distracted, and perplexed with the business that immediately engaged him, and thought that he was doing enough, if he kept up the sparring altercation of the lengthened controversy. In the mean-time he was deceiving himself and others by talking, and wishing, and hoping about the continuance of peace. At last, when the danger is at our very doors, talking, and wishing, and hoping, are no longer of any avail; the Doctor is now compelled to put on a grave face, and propose measures that bear some relation to our emergency. But the Doctor's measures were as ripe for execution, as his sixty sail of the line without men were fit for action. How crude and undigested, and how ill adapted to the *real state of things* those measures were, I need not insist upon. The plain facts, which I have stated, speak for themselves. They have taken up the time, and wearied out the patience of Parliament: and, although they have run the gauntlet of discussion, correction, modification, and revision, again and again, and have come forth unlike themselves, yet still they bear the marks which sufficiently indicate whence they originated. —Whenever I go into company, Mr. Cobbett, I constantly hear the observation made, (which observation, I doubt not, is made in ninety-nine companies out of an hundred, from John-o'-Groat's House to the Land's End,) that Mr. Addington is not the minister that suits the present times. I sometimes hear this observation coupled with a sage and candid proviso: "that however unfit he may be for his situation, he is nevertheless, an honest and a well-meaning man." I wonder not at such a sage and candid proviso. For we live, Mr. Cobbett, in the age

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of candour, moderation, and liberality. Besides, I know full well how indolent "the many" are, and how disposed they are, (somewhat after the manner of the "hogs in Westphalia") to pick up what falls from another, to swallow it at once without examination, and to retail it, in their turn, to their next neighbour. For my part, Mr. Cobbett, I am not disposed so easily to swallow all that these candid and liberal gentlemen have to say in favour of the well-meaning and honest minister. I say with the proverb, "handsome is, that handsome doth." I am no methodist. I am no supporter of the doctrine of faith without works. I judge of Mr. Addington as a minister, from his conduct as a minister. In order to bring this honesty and these good intentions, which are said to belong unto him, to the test, I would ask, is he himself conscious of that incapacity which is so universally acknowledged? I may be told, in reply, that he feels no consciousness of this sort. To what a colossal size then must his vanity be magnified!! Now I affirm, Mr. Cobbett, that it is incredible, nay impossible, that he should not be conscious of his incapacity; such a consciousness must be forced upon him every hour of his life, in spite of his vanity, enormous as it is. Vanity must have *something* to fix itself upon, before it can render a man utterly blind to his real character. A man possessing the common features of the human face, may look into a glass, and through vanity may imagine that his face is handsome. But if a man that has only one eye, or who has lost his nose "in the service," should flatter himself that his face was beautiful, we should consider him not only vain but mad. Now, I affirm, that Mr. A. in many respects, and on most occasions, possesses nothing on which vanity can fasten. There is an absolute vacuity without a single speck of pretension, unto which his vanity can cleave. How often, Mr. Cobbett, must his heart from within, and circumstances from without, have told him the unwelcome truth? How often, in the ordinary course of business, must he have been encountered by utter ignorance of the subject! How frequently must he have found himself in situations where he knew not what to think, what to resolve, nor whereunto to turn himself, and has been at his wits end? Could vanity dare to tell him, at those times, that he was at his proper post? No; vanity must have shrunk back, and self-complacency must have been confounded at the boisterous intrusion of doubt, dismay, and apprehension!—That his talents and his services are applauded by the nation at large, the

Doctor cannot be so blind, so deaf, and so stupid as to believe. If we may judge of his opinion on this head, from his uncommon exertion of influence, which his situation enables him to exert, we may conclude that he knows the truth. The press, I believe, Mr. Cobbett, was never under so powerful a controul, nor so grossly abused to the low purposes of crafty misrepresentation. Yes, the honest, well-meaning minister can find the means of "insidiously abusing the character, and sapping the credit" of a man whom he may vainly call his rival; but, who will never so far lower himself as to give that title in return to Mr. Addington.—The Doctor does not seem to have much reason to flatter his vanity, and self-importance from the consultations which he holds with his coadjutors in the administration. Do his patch-work measures which result from those deliberations, do his gigantic promises, and his pigmy performances of them, shew that he has that commanding influence at these deliberations which should belong to every prime minister, and which every prime minister should possess the talents to secure? No; nothing but half-measures issue from these consultations, where the sage, and the safe Premier, takes a little from one and a little from another; and (to use the market phrase) splits the difference between the divers and sundry opinions of his brethren, in order to please them all! But, I may be asked, does not Mr. A. see in the House of Commons enough to gratify his vanity, do not his large majorities bear testimony to his sufficiency and his merit? I answer, no. If he possesses the faintest spark of penetration, he must discover that the reverse is the real fact. He may indeed, command the compliance of the House, for reasons well known. But do his talents, and his measures command the attention and respect of the House? Mr. A. cannot but remember the conduct of that House towards his predecessor in office, and he cannot fail to make comparisons not very flattering to himself. Attention and respect were uniformly and scrupulously paid to Mr. Pitt, even by the bitterest of his opponents. He was listened to, and looked up to by all parties, as one who did credit to the assembly, and to the station which he filled in it. Can the most clamorous of Mr. Addington's proselytes; can the vanity of Mr. Addington himself dare to affirm that this is the case with respect to the present Chancellor of the Exchequer? No; amidst his "troop of friends," the most zealous are ashamed of their leader, and can scarcely stifle their contempt. All that they have to give is

— Mouth, honour, breath
— Which the poor heart would fain deny, and dares
“not.” —

The Doctor's affected condescension and courteousness, and his occasional acts of cunning and duplicity, prove that he is not altogether so confident in his capacity and talents, as not to resort to other means of prolonging his power and his emoluments. And does not his general conduct prove a consciousness of incapacity? To what are we to attribute his indecision, and his putting off the evil day of looking danger in the face, but to a consciousness of want of resources to meet it fairly, and to grapple with it. Hence it is, that he has thought, that “sufficient for the day is the evil thereof;” and that he has only provided for the day, without daring to look forward to future consequences. Hence it is, that he hath contented himself with patching up a present urgent necessity, without removing the evil; with affording palliatives rather than remedies. The Doctor, Mr. Cobbett, puts me in mind of those indolent housewives, who, instead of sweeping their houses clean, sweep all the dirt into a corner, and put the brush upon the heap. In the same manner does our sage and safe politician suffer difficulties to accumulate, instead of vigorously removing them; till at length, they will amount to so complicated an assemblage, that they will force themselves upon his attention with an importunity that will be heard. Then, Mr. Cobbett, if our condition should admit of consolation, we shall see our honest and well-meaning minister driven from his post, which he has so long retained, to the disgrace and the danger of the United Kingdom. — Let Englishmen, Mr. Cobbett, be opposed to Frenchmen upon the seas or upon the land, I fear not for the issue of the conflict. Under Providence, I confide all I hold dear to the spirit, bravery, and perseverance of my countrymen. But, when I see Mr. Addington and Co., pitted against Buonaparté and Talleyrand, I see feebleness, indecision, and folly; opposed to boldness, energy, and foresight. I tremble at the unequal contest. I despair not, however, as to the ultimate event, under all our disadvantages. Yet I tremble at protracted warfare, and at the great expenditure of blood and treasure, that under the discretion of the counsels of our safe politicians, and economical financiers, it must cost us before we can arrive at a successful termination of the contest. Yes, Mr. Cobbett, I tremble at the difficulties and dangers in which we must be involved, circumstanced as we are; and which we might avoid, if an enlightened, sagacious, decisive

minister were at the helm: one indeed, who deserved the name of statesman. The essential qualities which form a statesman, Mr. Addington possesses not; and never can possess. And he must, I say, be conscious of his deficiency. And what claim can he have to honesty and good intentions? When so much is at stake, how can he answer it to his conscience, his country, and his God, to fill a station for which nature never designed him; a station indeed, which he may think to be the highest honour, but it must sooner or later bring him to disgrace and ruin. — I am, Sir, your obedient humble servant.

A. Z.

THE VOLUNTEER BILL.

SIR, — Mr. Secretary Yorke states the number of effective yeomanry and volunteers to amount to 27,000 cavalry, 4,000 artillery, and 300,000 infantry. — This motley multitude, this amphibious army, it seems, can neither be dispensed with, nor suffered to continue in its present unwieldy state. How it is henceforth to be regulated, becomes, therefore, of the most serious importance, both to the nation and the individuals who enrolled themselves under the existing law. — They have a right to expect, and they do expect, from the wisdom and deliberation of Parliament, that the rules and regulations by which they are to be governed — the duties, penalties, and forfeitures to which they are to be subjected; and the pay, allowances, and exemptions to which they are to be entitled, shall, all of them, be declared and defined so clearly, consistently, and explicitly, that men of common capacities, like themselves, may understand them, without resorting to the acute intellects of an Attorney-General, or passing act after act to explain and amend the former, through as many gradations as the history of “the House that Jack built,” and yet (as Mrs. Dangle says in the Critic), “leaving the ‘‘interpret the most difficult to be understood.” — I have now before me “a bill (as amended on second reading in the Commons) — ‘‘to consolidate and amend the provisions of the several acts relating to corps of yeomanry and volunteers, and to make further regulations relating thereto.” What subsequent amendments it may have received in the Commons, or may yet receive in the Lords, I know not, and it may, perhaps, be owing to the muddy perplexity of my own brain, that it appears to me to want any, and not already to have attained that degree of perspicuity, which every candid, well-meaning, and

politician" must wish it to possess in the first instance. — Clause A provides, "that persons entitled to exemptions under former acts, shall have the benefit of them until the first return under this act," viz. 30th April, inst. (by section 10). — Clause B enacts, "that persons quitting or being discharged from any corps, shall immediately thereupon become liable to pay the duties upon horses and hair powder, payable in the year ending 5th April succeeding such quitting or discharge." —

Quere. Under this clause, if a person shall quit or be discharged from his corps any time before April 5, 1805, would he not be deprived of his exemptions, although he should have attended 50 days in the year ending the 5th April inst. and 100 in the year ending the 5th April, 1805, and although by the 43 Geo III. c. 31. (the duties under which become payable only from the 5th April inst.) five days attendance in the last year entitles him to exemptions for the present? — Clause No. 3, enacts, "that every person claiming exemption for any horse provided for the use of yeomanry, shall, during all the period of his having the benefit of such exemption (i. e. the year after having provided the horse) be liable to furnish a horse whenever the corps shall assemble, or shall forfeit for every default £30!!! I fear we might soon talk of Parliaments in the past tense, if it could not truly be said,

"That to their plighted vows and trust they ever firmly stood,

"And tho' they promis'd to their loss, they made their promise good."

That these exemptions, at the time and in the manner they were allowed, were both unnecessary and mischievous, nobody doubts any more than that Parliament is bound to fulfil them faithfully for the time past, and restrict them for the time to come. When first turned to clause No. 6, "allowing to the master an abatement from the wages of his servant in proportion to the time of his absence at exercise, to be settled by a Justice of Peace," I gave the framers of the bill credit for devising a cunning expedient to rescue farmer's and tradesmen's servants (from amongst whom both the militia and line must principally be recruited) from their false imprisonment in volunteer corps; but I have some doubt whether this was their intention, though it is pretty sure to be the effect. — By section 10, "returns are to be made April 1, August 1, and December 1, and four days attendance of cavalry is required in each four months, or twelve days in the year."

Quere. Does this bill compute the year from January 1? The assessed tax acts compute it from April 5. — By section 6, "cavalry must attend a certain number of days to entitle them to exemptions, unless absent with leave or prevented by sickness;" but no provision is made for the case of a disabled horse, nor allowance if killed in actual service. — If persons providing horses are exempt from the duty upon them, why (instead of a wrangle before a magistrate) should not masters providing servants, for whom they pay assessed taxes, be also exempt from the duty upon them? — The groom is more likely to be a good dragoon than his master, and to endure the fatigues of service; and since we know there will be nearly as many of them as of the "gentlemen soldiers" and officers, (who are no soldiers!!) they attend, why not parade in laced uniforms instead of laced liveries, unless, indeed, this might be deemed to disparage rather than display the dignity of the troop!

"Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis tempus eget."

By section 16, "commanding officers are subjected to a penalty for making a false return;" but no provision is made in case of no return, or of withholding or misapplying pay, allowances, &c. or disallowing attendance, or discharging from the corps wantonly. — Clause No. 9, directs the Lieutenants in apportioning the number of men to serve in the militia "to have regard to the number of volunteers." — Is this "having regard to" legislative precision? — Clause No. 11, impowers "persons who, on account of changing residence, shall quit one corps, to enter *ad eundem* into another." Quere. Why confined to this single cause of changing corps, there may be many other good ones? — Clause No. 2, subjects "persons refusing to redeliver, pawning, selling, or losing arms, &c. to a penalty of 40s;" but by clause 50, the same offences (with some further enumerations) are subjected to a penalty of 10l., and double the value of the arms, &c. Quere. Might not these two clauses, and also clause L. (imposing a penalty upon buying, concealing, or receiving arms, &c.) be consistently embodied into one clause? — Clause 22, directs the volunteers to assemble in case of invasion, or appearance of an enemy in force on the coast, or of rebellion or insurrection, arising or existing in either of the *aforesaid* cases, but in no other case of rebellion or insurrection. The reason of this special restriction is not sufficiently obvious!

— Clause G enacts, "that whenever a corps shall *voluntarily assemble* to do military duty upon an appearance of invasion, or for the purpose of improving themselves in military exercise, the Receiver-General may be empowered to pay them, not exceeding one guinea each (which the commanding officer may lay out in providing such necessaries as he shall think necessary!)" The following clause, No. 32, enacts, "that when so voluntarily assembled and doing military duty, with the approbation of his Majesty, they shall be entitled to receive pay and to be quartered and billeted."— Clause 24, enacts, "that *whenever* any corps shall, with the approbation of his Majesty, *voluntarily assemble* or march to do military duty on appearance of invasion, or for the purpose of improving themselves in military exercise, &c. they shall be subject to military discipline and the mutiny laws."— Clause 39, enacts, "that, when *not* summoned on actual service, or *voluntarily assembled* for the purpose of doing military duty, and subjected to military discipline, if they shall signify, through their commanding officer, their desire to assemble under the command of *their own officers within the same* (why not, "or adjoining") county, for the purpose of being *trained and exercised* for a time not exceeding 14 days in 12 months, the Lord Lieutenant may, with the approbation of his Majesty, make an order for assembling, quartering, and billeting them." Quere. What is the difference between "voluntarily assembling to improve themselves in military exercise," and "voluntarily assembling to be trained and exercised," *when not voluntarily assembled to improve in military exercise?* For on this difference, how incomprehensible soever, seems to depend their being or not being subjected to military discipline, and entitled to pay.— Quere, also, are they to be under *other than their own officers* when assembled under clause 24?— Section 6, requires 12 days attendance of cavalry before they can be deemed effective, or entitled to exemptions. Clause 99, restricts the power of the Lord Lieutenants to assemble them to 14 days. Clause 24, has no restriction whatever as to the period of time they may be voluntarily assembled, &c. And clause 32, entitles them to pay when so assembled.— Quere. Are they entitled to pay for the 12 days they must attend, in order to become effective? Are they, if they should, besides those 12 days, voluntarily assemble for 14 more, under the Lord Lieutenant's order, entitled to pay for these 14 days also? They are furthermore required, by clause 14, to be inspected once in

every four months." Are they entitled to further pay for the days of inspection? And if they should "voluntarily assemble" for a still further and indefinite length of time (under clause 24), are they entitled to pay for so long as they shall remain so assembled?— It is worthy of remark, that the corps at large are subjected to the mutiny laws at large, *while improving themselves in military exercise*; but adjutants, serjeant majors, drill serjeants and serjeants, trumpeters and drummers, receiving constant pay, are especially protected from any punishment, extending to life or limb, *except in cases of invasion, or appearance of an enemy in force upon the coast.*— Such being the actual state of the volunteer system (if it deserves that name), and of the bill by which it is intended to be new-modelled, circular letters, it seems, have been addressed to the commanding officers, directing them to *feel the pulses* of their corps, as to going out upon what is called "permanent duty." To say nothing of men in arms being called upon to *deliberate* upon the duty they will or they will not do, and to abstain from any conjecture which they may be pleased to elect, the actual expense of this measure, even for a few days, must be enormous in money, and still more so in labour and industry, while the benefit to the individuals in discipline is at best problematical; every man, who knows any thing of the army, knows that soldiers cannot be completely drilled, but in small bodies, and if it be intended that the volunteers are to have the benefit of doing duty with the regulars, and the regulars to have the honour of doing duty with the volunteers, I profess I can forebode neither honour nor profit from such a heterogeneous mixture.— The more I consider the subject, the more clearly I am convinced that the volunteers can only be useful as a local force in small bodies, which neither requires much discipline or fatigue, nor exhausts the sources of recruiting the army and militia, in this point of view the institution is excellent, but the attempt to push it beyond this, its proper sphere, was taking a wrong road, which, the longer it is persisted in, will diverge farther and farther from the right one, till it may be wished and sought for in vain. Could but the same men who are now volunteers *actually* become the thing they would seem to be, soldiers: the spirit might be willing, but in most instances the flesh would prove weak, the parishes would sink under the burden imposed upon them, counting-houses, trades, professions, manufactures, and agriculture would alike be deserted, in one word a



would revolutionise the country.—I have thus briefly stated my observations and difficulties as a reference to the bill suggested them, and I have stated them *to you*, because, without any farther knowledge than from your publications, and without the propensity to flatter any man, I believe you to be actuated by the same motives as myself, a *disinterested* love of my country. Huddibras says,

"He that against the wall knocks out his brains,

"The Devil must be in him if he feigns."

And neither you nor I have ever yet been convicted of ministerial idolatry.—If these observations should appear to deserve insertion in your valuable Journal, I shall think that their most appropriate reward:

Valeant quantum valere debent.

Reading, April 3.

PROBUS.

QUARTER MASTERS OF CAVALRY.

SIR,—It is hoped you will allow a place for a few words in behalf of a very poor, but very deserving class of men, the *half-pay quarter-masters of cavalry reduced on the 24th of June, 1802*. There were at that period, in consequence of the reduction it was then thought proper to make in our cavalry establishment, about one-hundred quarter-masters placed on half-pay; and, as it is now understood, that an augmentation of two troops to each regiment is about to take place, they very naturally hope that they may, great part of them at least, be again employed; indeed, there could be but little doubt of it, should the circumstance occur to his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief; but, his Royal Highness's mind is necessarily employed upon subjects of so much greater importance to the army and the public at large, that it cannot be expected he should turn his attention to it, unless it is brought to his remembrance.—The appointment of quarter-master in the cavalry, is held by warrant from the colonel of the regiment; and all of them, according to the orders of his Royal Highness, "must be appointed from persons actually serving as serjeants in the cavalry, and no sum of money shall either be given or received, directly or indirectly, for the appointment." They have, indeed, great part of them been serjeant-majors; and generally men of much experience and long service; yet it appears very extraordinary, and peculiarly hard, that, by the letter from Mr. Yorke allowing adjutants on full pay to volunteers and yeomanry corps, they are ex-

cluded from that situation, as it states that persons so appointed, must have served four years as commissioned officers or serjeant-majors; when, as before stated, most of the quarter-masters reduced on the 24th of June, 1802, have been serjeant-majors; and, have also, perhaps, served twenty years in the dragoons. Surely such men, from their great experience in cavalry matters, would make better adjutants to yeomanry than a commissioned officer who has served four years. It is therefore hoped, that this class of officers may be employed, either in the regiment, at the approaching augmentation, or in the yeomanry.—They are now, without being of any service to their country, a great expense to it, and much against their inclination.

FORRIAL.

TO LORD REDESDALE.

MY LORD.—It has never been considered as a pleasing or a generous task to assail a character already fallen in the estimation of the public. The recollection of this principle should have protected you from the censure of the author of this letter, were it not for a circumstance peculiar to your case, and which renders improper that forbearance which you might otherwise have owed to compassion. The feeble and peevish defence contained in your last letter, rests wholly on a declaration that, if the correspondence had been productive of any harm, it must be attributed not to you but to Lord Fingal, not to the author, but to the publisher of what was from its nature strictly private.—Is your lordship aware of the magnitude of this charge? Do you know that it is one of those which cannot be made without disgrace either to the accused or to the accuser? Or has the morality of chancery taught you that the publication of a private letter is a mere peccadillo, a trifling inaccuracy, a venial mistake, which it was perfectly allowable to impute to Lord Fingal, for the purpose of vindicating your own character from what you deemed a grave imputation? What may be your lordship's sentiments I know not, but from men of honour you might have learnt, that there is no crime against society so weighty, more unpardonable, or which so certainly degrades the offender from the rank of a gentleman. On this point then, you are fairly at issue with Lord F. you have virtually taxed him with baseness and perfidy, and if the charge turns out to be unfounded, the opinion of the world, already made up as to your prudence, may perhaps be decided, as to some other parts of your cha-

racter it must not be forgotten that Lord F. is a man confessedly of moderate abilities, and (following the last and improved edition of your thoughts on the subject) of no considerable weight; he is therefore wholly unprotected, except as far as protection may be derived from a body suspected and over-awed by the government. You are a person in the highest office, a distinguished lawyer; and, as we all have seen, a most elegant writer, and what is yet more to the purpose, supported by the whole influence of administration. Every man, therefore, has an interest in the defence of this nobleman's innocence, unless indeed he is willing to resign his reputation whenever the sacrifice may be necessary to cover the imprudence of a Chancellor.——The only difficulty I find in discussing the question, arises from the total absence of argument from the side of your lordship and your friends. You have indeed asserted roundly and boldly, but you have prudently abstained from any attempt at proof. If, however, I can shew, as may be done in few words, that there is no definition of "privacy" which would apply to the letters, he will stand acquitted of all blame in the publication.——Were they private from the situation of the parties? They were from the Lord Chancellor to a political leader, a person of great consequence (as he then imagined him; and it seems that his opinion has since undergone a change) from the connexion subsisting between the authors? They were scarcely, if at all acquainted.——From the subject? They related to well known and long agitated questions.——From any injunction to secrecy by which they were accompanied? Not a trace of it appears in them, as they have been published, nor has it been pretended that any thing of that kind existed in the originals. All the marks of privacy have, I believe, now been enumerated, not one of which is to be found in your invaluable epistles. What then do you require us to admit?——that the letters of the first law officer of the crown, addressed to the chief, of what he calls, and by calling has perhaps made a hostile faction, of whom he had no personal knowledge, and on whom he had laid no injunction to conceal their contents, letters against the Catholics to a catholic nobleman are strictly private. To state such an absurdity is to refute it. I will even go further, and venture to declare not only that this correspondence was not confidential, not only that Lord F. was at liberty to publish it, but, but that he would have been highly culpable if he had not

suffered it to see the light. By means of it he became possessed of a strong and authentic evidence of what was the disposition of Government towards the Catholics. Your lordship kindly informed him that their loyalty was suspected, their professions distrusted, with systematic intention formed of excluding them from what, justly or not, they regard as their natural rights. Had he concealed from them documents of such importance, he would have been guilty of gross and cruel dissimulation towards the whole body of his brethren, and rendered himself wholly unworthy of the confidence reposed in him as their head. I have stated the reasons which convince me that the obligation on Lord F. was to publish, rather than to conceal your letters. There is, besides, no light presumption that you did not yourself originally wish them to be concealed; that the idea of their suppression was an after-thought forced upon you by an unforeseen necessity. My lord, these productions must have been the result of no inconsiderable labour. The liberal and exalted sentiments by which they are pervaded, their polished style, and above all, the treasure of theological erudition which they contain, (erudition not the less valuable for being a little stale, and for not squaring exactly with the licentious principles of later days) clearly shew that they must have employed all your *bonæ subsecivæ*, all those moments that were not taken up by your legal and political cares. Perhaps, indeed, they were even suffered to interfere with your more urgent occupations. If then, owing to some strange misconception of what was his duty, and your design, Lord Fingal has resolved to suppress them, how deeply would your feelings, as an author, have been wounded. You would have been obliged to have recourse to the importunity of friends, or "a surreptitious copy;" or if these old approved methods had failed, you would then have had no other resource than to recast your matter into a distinct formal treatise against Catholic veracity, Catholic loyalty, and Catholic patriotism.——I am, my Lord, &c. &c. CRITO.

LORD REDESDALE'S LETTERS.

SIR,——The truth of the remark, that the most important events oftentimes proceed from the most trifling causes, has never been more happily illustrated than in the effect produced by the correspondence between the Chancellor of Ireland and the Earl of Fingal. The mere solicitation for a commission, as justice of the peace, led to a discussion which has materially tended to re-

cue the Catholics of Ireland from the obloquy which attached to their religion, as having the seeds of disloyalty in their very creed. That Lord Redesdale has acted from pure motives, I am not inclined to question, nor can I avoid expressing, in high terms of admiration, how much I am pleased with the manly intrepidity of his character, that prompted him, in defiance of his professional caution, to encounter singly, the arguments of the Catholic School. But, alas! good man, his zeal overcame his judgment, he turns a deaf ear to the sufferings of the unfortunate O'Neil, and wishes to insinuate that treason lurks under the guise of an humble remonstrance. We suppose, or at least we ought to suppose, that any thing coming from the pen of a man in the high office of Lord Chancellor, and bearing the stamp of his authority, possesses considerable weight; but we must smile at the quibbling fallacy of that argument, which tells the titular Bishop of Cloyne, that he ought not to feel himself injured at any reflections thrown on his character, so long as they remain unknown to the world, secure in the closet of the Earl of Fingall. The man who descends to so mean a subterfuge, cannot afterwards possibly expect any great deference to his opinions, opinions which have not even *novelty* to recommend them. That the Catholic Creed inculcates no faith to be kept with Heretics, was attempted to be established by the Methodist Wesley, his arguments were ably answered, and refuted by the ingenious Father O'Leary. — I am, Sir, yours, &c.

A PROTESTANT.

BLOCKING SYSTEM.

Sir, — I should not, probably, have resumed the subject of my former letter, had I not thought it incumbent on me to correct the gross misrepresentations of your correspondent T. H. in the Register of the 24th of March last, p. 417. He remarks, "that I condemn the system of blockading the enemy's fleets," and, "that I conjure the present ministry to imitate the conduct of their predecessors in the former war." That is, (according to his ingenious interpretation) I condemn the blockading system altogether; and at the same time, I conjure the present administration to follow the example of those who universally, and, as far as I am able to judge, very properly, adopted it. — On a reference to my letter in your Weekly Register, of the 25th Feb. the fact will however, appear to be, that I have not done either; and, therefore, that the absurdity resulting

from his misrepresentation originates solely from himself. — So far am I from generally condemning the system of blockading our enemy's fleets, that I expressly declare my opinion, that every port in the British Channel, and on the line of coast on the North Sea, which contains any hostile armament, ought to be as strictly and as constantly blockaded as the nature of circumstances will admit. — With respect to the blockade of the harbours of Brest, Toulon, Cadiz, and the Texel, during the late war, I observed the measure was then indispensably necessary to prevent the junction of the allied fleets; but, as we were not now at war with Spain, as we keep the Texel in a state of blockade, and have a Channel fleet decidedly and greatly superior to that of the enemy ready for sea, in Brest harbour; I could not see the expediency or wisdom of employing more than double their number of our best ships, during the winter months in blockading them. — The expense, the wear, and the continual danger to which this measure inevitably exposes our great national bulwark, I took occasion in my former letter amply to discuss. They are, indeed, too evident to be doubted by any one in the least acquainted with nautical affairs, even though not possessed of that "tactical" knowledge which T. H. may think necessary, and which he may, probably, be himself endowed with, though he has not, in his letter to you, made any ostentatious display of it. When the gallant and indefatigable Admiral Cornwallis, notwithstanding the unparalleled exertions of himself, his officers, and seamen, was blown from the French coast, and compelled to raise the blockade of Brest harbour for several days, it is a well known fact that the hostile fleet did not even attempt to sail after the gale was abated. Yet they had every reason to believe, that the blockading fleet had been obliged to retire, in a disabled and crippled state, to its own harbours to repair the damages it had sustained. — The conduct of the enemy, on this memorable occasion, most powerfully corroborates the opinion I have advanced in my former letter, respecting the impolicy of blockading Brest harbour, even with a number of ships equal to theirs. If they were afraid to venture out when our grand Channel fleet was shattered by an unequal and unavailing contest with resistless elements; and when they had no vigilance to elude, no obstructions to surmount, and no peril to dread, is it probable they would sail from Brest, filled with troops, and encumbered with transports,

(as they must necessarily be to attempt invasion,) when they must be assured they would have the most formidable impediments to encounter, and the complicated dangers of unfavourable weather, interception, or pursuit, continually to apprehend?—Should these considerations be ineffectual to restrain them, and were it possible to suppose their inherent dread of the British navy could be at once succeeded by unexampled temerity, what have we to dread from so unexpected a revolution in their opinions and conduct? Have we not every reason to hope that a splendid and important victory would in such a case reward us for suffering the Brest fleet to sail? If T. H. finds himself in the least degree inclined to investigate, or to contest this point with me, by the issue of fair, liberal, and rational discussion, I am ready to meet him on this ground whenever he pleases.—I must, however, stipulate, as preliminary articles, that he will not again misrepresent my meaning, or misquote my words, either from want of attention, apprehension, or candour; and that he will consign the unmeaning literary *slang* of “prosing oratory,” “flimsy argument,” and all such despicable ribaldry to that *servum pecus*, or “swinish multitude,” of Grub-street writers from whom such nonsense originated, and to whom it ought exclusively to belong.—The well-informed readers of the Weekly Register, and T. H. himself must, I am convinced, have too much good sense to mistake such miserable banter for argument, or even for wit. I am by no means disposed to admit, that because the blockade of Brest does not appear to me a wise measure, the sincere tribute of praise which is justly due from me, and from every Briton to Admiral Cornwallis, his officers, and seamen, for their indefatigable exertions in the performance of this arduous duty, should, as T. H. asserts, “be rejected by them;” nor, do I believe they will. They who have shewn so glorious an example of strict adherence to their duty, under the most trying circumstances, have too high a respect for naval and military discipline, not to know that their public conduct must never be directed by private opinion; and, that their merit consists in their rigid performance of the orders they receive, though they may entertain very different opinions from those who issued them; but whom, as their superior officers, they are bound to obey.—On this principle T. H. will, I trust, admit, that the gallant Admiral and his associates are equally entitled to the praise and admiration of those who approve, or of those who

censure the measure of blockading Brest. However we may differ in opinion respecting the blockade, he appears perfectly to coincide with me, in thinking an equal number of ships to that of the enemy's fleet, is amply sufficient for this purpose.—What then must be the opinion of his good friends and allies the ministerial Newspaper Editors, who always pretend to, and of course ought to possess, the most authentic information, when they comfort us with the intelligence, “that the enemy have not more than 8 or 10 sail of the line fit for sea in the outer harbour of Brest, while the blockading fleet consists of not less than double the number.” I believe, I am perfectly correct in stating, that no longer than three or four weeks ago, it was *exultingly* announced by one of these ephemeral chronicles of Britain's glory under the present administration, “that the French had only nine sail of the line fit for sea in Brest harbour, though our blockading fleet consisted of twenty-five sail of the line!” What a proud boast for Britain! How are the various and memorable exploits of Bridport, Cornwallis, Smith, Warren, and a long list of illustrious heroes; how are even the immortal victories of the 1st of June, 1794, of Cape St. Vincent and Camperdown, in 1797, of Aboukir in 1798, and of Copenhagen in 1801, eclipsed by this transcendent emanation of British glory in 1804!—Many however, there are, so blinded by prejudice, as not to discover honour, or profit, or any cause for exultation, in this expensive, hazardous, and unnecessary display of naval superiority off Brest; from whence no attempt to invade England was expected; while, on the Southern, Eastern, and Northern Coasts, where invasion is to be continually looked for, not only from the insolent menaces, but from the astonishing preparations of the enemy, our naval force, to resist the premeditated attack is comparatively feeble and insignificant. The fleet in the Downs, which has of late been considerably reinforced, at this time consists of no more than eighteen sail, viz. two of 74 guns, two of 64, one of 50, five frigates, two sloops, four gun-brigs, two bombs; to these may probably be added a few detached cruizers. The North Sea fleet, and the ships stationed along its extensive coast, are also greatly inferior in number to what they were in the last war. The increased force of the invading enemy on the opposite coast, has been in the mean time rapidly advancing, in an inverse ratio, to the diminution of ours. At Boulogne alone, the naval force is stated to consist of

from one thousand to twelve hundred vessels of different kinds; many of these vessels are said to be of considerable force and burden. From three to five hundred more are reported to be ready for sea at Calais, Dunkirk, Flushing, and smaller ports on the coast, immediately opposite to Sussex, Kent, Essex, and Suffolk. To the above force is to be added the considerable armament in the Texel, blockaded by the North Sea fleet.—The force in the Downs, which has hitherto kept that in the opposite ports above mentioned, (consisting of 1500 or 1600 vessels) in their harbours, or under their batteries, and done more than could reasonably have been expected, must be totally unable to prevent this formidable armament, or by far the greatest part of it, from reaching our coast if favoured by a calm. In such a case, which in the approaching season may frequently occur, our line of battle ships, frigates, sloops, bombs, and even our gun-brigs would be of little use in opposing those numerous flotillas, which, by means of their oars, would always keep clear of the range of their guns and shells; and, which they could neither obstruct nor pursue. But as this subject has been already discussed by your various naval correspondents, and my letter has exceeded its intended length, I shall conclude, by assuring you, that I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c.

BRITANNICUS.

ANSWER TO Y.'S DEFENCE OF THE
ADMIRALTY.

SIR,—I am much diverted with a letter in the Register of the 31st of March last, [p. 470], signed Y., at the top of which is written, with great gravity, "*a defence of the Admiralty*;" I suppose, Sir, with the same view as the painter of yore, put over his daubings, *this is a tyger*, that people might, at least, understand what it was meant to represent. The writer certainly possesses a quality of which he entreats you to let him retain the exclusive possession, as he arraigns some of your correspondents for partiality, merely because they dare make that public board the object of their attack; whose measures he thinks proper to defend. While you, Mr. Cobbett, set in your arm chair, like Cato, with the bane Mr. Y. in one hand, and the antidote Mr. X. in the other. Really, Sir, if I was not acquainted with your inflexible justice and integrity, I should be somewhat puzzled that you could, for an instant, admit into your Register, any thing which can even be called a defence of cranny, ignorance, and oppression. These

are hard words, and Mr. Y. may say, that these are general assertions of mismanagement; but after the downright facts, which have been stated in your former numbers, facts which have never been contradicted, and which if an inquiry into the state of the navy and the administration thereof had been permitted, would have been proved by incontrovertible evidence, I am rather surprized at any person's being hardy enough to send you a piece of paper of the nature I am now commenting upon. Mr. Y. talks of "*assertions without proofs*," and, in a few lines afterwards, says, "*I assert from personal knowledge, that the business of the dock-yards never went on with more alacrity, cheerfulness, and economy, than at present.*" I perceive, Sir, that he feels it very easy to assert, but the proof is rather more difficult, and even through the optics of Mr. Y. I think, it would be hard to distinguish all he asserts. The "*alacrity*" is, indeed, such as we see practised by school boys, with an usher to attend them; or by a gang of slaves, with an overseer's whip at their back; and their cheerfulness reminds me more of that exhibited by a malefactor on the new drop, than any thing else. As for economy, Sir, it is a fine word, but it is a very rare and difficult virtue. If by economy is meant mere *saving of present expense*, no one will deny the Admiralty that merit, but it is a saving which will probably end in our ruin. In the dock-yards, there is neither timber, nor masts, nor artificers sufficient for the exigencies of the times. Your correspondent X. has proved the first, and as to the last, at Portsmouth, whence Mr. Y. dates his letter, there are actually, at this moment, sixty blacksmiths short of the usual number, and 200 shipwrights; nor can any of these two valuable classes of men be induced by any means to enter under the present regulations. That a great deal of money is saved in this manner, and by not paying for these necessary articles, may be true; but, that if it is *economy*, I deny; because, had the artificers been retained, when they had them, or had the stores not been sold at the peace, or had been laid in, when they were to be obtained at the cheapest rate, they would not be obliged to offer the exorbitant prices and accept of the contracts, which they must now do; and, instead of turning ships out of dock for want of materials, they would have been repaired and rendered fit for service; which, at present, they are not; and, as for looking up with confidence for *promotion* to the present Admiralty, the shameful example of Plymouth Yard is too recent a

fact for any person easily to give credit to such a tale. Any body, whose brother happens to be of use to the *first Lord*, is certain to obtain rank and preferment over his Majesty's veteran servants, although he should never have served an hour in the King's Yards. Such, Sir, is the true picture of the dock-yards, which certainly exhibits a very different colouring to that painted by Mr. Y. His next article of defence is the surgical establishment of the navy. In the first place, every improvement in the hospitals, which he mentions, was the work of the former Board of Admiralty, the effects of which the present have endeavoured to pervert, mutilate, and destroy as much as possible; for instance, medicines, which were returned at the end of the war, *as unfit for use*, were *repacked* and sent on board ships destined for foreign service: this may be called "*economy*." Dr. Baird was sent round to see this economical plan put in force, and by way of economy we must suppose a very great addition was made to his salary over and above that of his exalted situation. This is one of those charges which we hope, with Mr. Y., will meet the public eye through a more authentic channel. The cruel and unjust treatment of Dr. Blane, of Mr. Bannantine and Dr. Aberdour, and twenty others, will also, we hope, meet with a similar investigation, in whose cases a tyranny and cruelty will be found, beyond perhaps the belief, and certainly beyond the feeling of an English public. The encouragement of surgeons is less than ever, and the testimony of the whole service will bear me out in asserting, that it is, at this moment, worse off, in that respect, than ever it was. So much for the assertions and veracity of Mr. Y. As to the public services of Lord St. V. no English heart will ever forget his conduct off that Cape, from whence he derived his title; but is the meritorious service of an officer, in one situation, full of health and vigour, a sufficient proof of ability to qualify him for another situation, especially when his mind and body are debilitated with acute disease, and that disease perhaps the one of all others which most unnerves the springs of the human mind. It is not Lord St. V. at sea; but it is Lord St. V. on shore, at the head of an office where vigour, capacity, knowledge of the service and of human nature combined, that is required, who is complained of. It is Lord St. V. deprived of his acuteness and powers of mind, leaving his office to the care and superintendence of those who have neither vigour, capacity, knowledge of the service of human nature,

of whom the public have a right to complain. Lord St. Vincent's services heretofore, *as an admiral*, live in the grateful mind of every one, and those services have been amply rewarded by the highest rank, and the most liberal remuneration that ever was given to any individual at once. May they not, indeed, have been so great as partly to occasion every calamity we deplore? May not that quick and irritable disposition which is, perhaps, necessary, and, indeed, not much felt in a fleet at sea, where vigorous and even harsh measures are the real springs of action and discipline? May it not, on shore, have burst into violence and despotism, and set such an example to those whose education and physical endowments do not enable them to judge so properly as he does, so as to make them perfectly unfit for the management of a machine, where civilized life, where a due observance of forms, and where a thorough knowledge of human nature, in all its shapes, is absolutely necessary? It is, Sir, to the want of these requisites in those to whom the common mechanism of this great machine is entrusted, that its component parts are disjointed and out of order; but it is owing to Lord St. V. alone, and to that state of health, which, perhaps, has precluded his advice being given in the cabinet, that its secret and powerful springs are rusted, and that its effects, in every part of the globe, are palsied. Every day will bring in fresh proofs of this, and we have now been engaged in war only long enough to hear from our distant settlements, what havoc has been made by the total want of arrangement in the naval department. In the East-Indies, an enemy's squadron ranging at large, without our own admiral knowing any thing of the war; which squadron was actually at anchor with the English one, and might have been taken possession of, had he received the proper notice. In the West-Indies, the whole of the coasting trade annoyed and captured by the enemy's privateers, without a single vessel of a proper description to check their depredations; on the coast of Guinea, our forts or vessels taken by a handful of men and a few privateers, who are now cruising unmolested, and perhaps even now in possession of our store-ship, which sailed last month, as we have not a single ship of war on that station. At home the enemy with a force capable of attacking and hourly menacing our shores, and bidding defiance to the ships we have in the Channel, which ships are inadequate in numbers as well as construction to protect our coasting convoys which are captured close in our own batteries. This, Sir,

the true picture not overcharged, but the truth of which, every officer employed will vouch for, except, indeed, such as can be gained to unsay their daily conversations, and who have a son or brother to provide for. Now, Sir, let us look to that part of our force, upon which the ministers build their warlike fame; the fleet which is said to be blockading the enemy's ports. Alas! Sir! flattering as such a sound may be to the English ear; proud as we may feel ourselves in having officers, whose perseverance is beyond all example, it is a sound without meaning; it is, as now carried on, the passing bell to the existence of our navy; the officers, the men, and the ships, will, and must sink under the constant harassing duty they are consigned to. Where are the ships to replace them? The *economy*, that boasted watch word which Mr. Y. thinks will silence all observation of the Admiralty has deprived us of the very means of doing it, and even, at the moment I am writing, news of the loss of our own line of battle ships, and of the escape of a part of the enemy's fleet from Brest is announced. How long will this be borne? Are we to sleep only to awake in death? Are the speeches and time-serving flatteries of Mr. Sheridan to be believed, before the undoubted, and unequivocal opinions of almost every officer of rank and knowledge in the navy? I do not wish to be governed by the opinions of those, whom Mr. Sheridan accuses (as if it were their fault) of sauntering about upon half pay, and out of employment. No, Sir, I refer to the judgment of every officer of high rank, *actually now in command*, who (if Mr. Pitt's inquiry had been acquiesced in, and had gone into the length it ought) would have stated their opinions, and have stamped an authenticity upon them, which even Sir E. P. backed by Messrs. Tokeley and Day, could not have controverted. And then, what are we told, O! you must not *presume to judge*. No sea officer whatsoever is competent to set up his opinion in contradiction to the all-wise, all provident, all-economical, and all-protecting measures of this great man. It is thus, Mr. Cobbett, that we are to be delivered blindfold into the jaws of destruction, and if any man, or set of men, whose profession, knowledge, those habits of study, or whose enlightened minds lead them to doubt the efficacy of the measures that are adopted, they are accused of petulance, of disappointment, and personal motives for their conduct. But, what is to be said if all these accusations turn out to be true? What is to be done, if, when it is too late, the eyes of the

public are opened, to the precipice, upon the verge of which they not only are standing, but actually falling into? Will they have time to repair the errors which they have been told of, and will any proceeding against Lord St. Vincent, or against others who are too insignificant to think upon, be any recompence for the danger and difficulties, into which this country will be plunged by their neglect? Neglect which every step they have taken since Mr. Pitt's motion proves? Are they not *now* contracting for the very vessels which he pointed out, and which they decried as useless? Are they not endeavouring to do every thing which he stated, but in a way, which, at the same time that it points out their acknowledgement of the utility of his plans, marks their imbecility in the execution of them. — I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c. ARGONAUT.

NAVAL ECONOMY.

SIR,—Mr. Addington makes a great boast of the *savings* in the naval department in the year 1803; and attributes it, in a great degree, to the *economy* of the Admiralty. But, Sir, I will explain to you how the surplus has been occasioned. In the first place, when the late Emperor of Russia laid an embargo on our trade, it was found necessary to send to different parts of the world for the article of hemp (the most expensive commodity used in the yards), which was supplied at an enormous expense. When the embargo was taken off, in order that we might not be distressed again, the Navy Board deemed it prudent to make immense contracts: and in 1801 and 1802, there was as much hemp received in the yards, as was adequate to 3 or 4 years consumption, the amount of it was nearly a million and a half; therefore in 1803, a very small quantity was contracted for. In the next place the monies which were granted for the maintenance of the 100,000 seamen and marines, a considerable part of which has not been expended, owing to the ships not having come in course of payment, it being always the custom of the service to have 6 months arrears due. Therefore, Sir, the surplus is not *altogether* to be attributed to the *economy* of the Admiralty, but in great measure to the causes which I have adduced. — I am, Sir, yours, &c. X.

COMPLAINTS OF THE JAMAICA COLONISTS.

SIR,—In your Register of the 17th of March last, you allude to a message sent by the Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica to the

Assembly; and their answer to it. You will now receive, enclosed, a paper, which may serve as an explanation for their conduct.—You will, however, observe, that the duty on the import into Great-Britain, of 1 cwt. of sugar is now 1l. 4s., instead of 1l. as marked in the paper; and hence it appears, that, supposing sugar to sell at 3l. per

cwt., a duty is paid to Government, of 8s. in the pound, and more or less, according to the price of the sugar sold. You will judge from this, whether the Assembly has deserved the censure of the Lieutenant Governor; and whether the colony of Jamaica ought to lose the confidence of Great-Britain.

| Sugar. | | Wts. Sold. | | Duties pd. | | | Charges. | | | Insurance | | | Nett Proc. | | | Gross Sales. | | | |
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| Hhds. | Tres | Cwt. | qr. | lb. | £. | s. | d. | £. | s. | d. | £. | s. | d. | £. | s. | d. | £. | s. | d. |
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| 60 | 24 | 956 | 0 | 2 | 956 | 9 | 4 | 501 | 12 | 2 | 73 | 2 | 5 | 1437 | 17 | 10 | 2969 | 1 | 9 |
| 20 | | 255 | 0 | 25 | 255 | 13 | 9 | 118 | 0 | 0 | 38 | 0 | 0 | 352 | 2 | 9 | 763 | 16 | 6 |
| 319 | 50 | 4769 | 0 | 20 | 4771 | 9 | 0 | 2403 | 13 | 9 | 365 | 0 | 11 | 7628 | 1 | 1 | 15168 | 4 | 9 |
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| 3 | 3 | 7½ | | | | | 3.180 |
| 0 | 4 | 0 | per Cwt. or 20 per Cent. on Old Duty additional | .200 | | | |
| 0 | 0 | 8 | per Cwt. or 3 per Cent. Export Duty on £1 : 2 : 4 Supplies outward..... | .033 | | | |
| 0 | 5 | 0 | per Cwt. to the Planter provided Rum Crop will pay Island Contingencies, &c. | .200 | | | |
| N. B. There is not an Estate in the West-Indies where the Rum pays its Contingencies if it does not make 400 Hogsheads annually. | | | | | | | |
| 2 | 8 | 1½ | per Cent. on Gross Sales.. Peace Insurance.. | 15168.237:305.045::£100 Answer | 2.406 | | |
| 15 | 16 | 11½ | per Cent. on ditto.. Peace Tret and Charges.. | 15168.237:2403.687::£100 Answer | 15.846 | | |
| 31 | 9 | 1½ | per Cent. on ditto.. Duties on Gross Sales .. | 15168.237:4771.450::£100 Answer | 31.456 | | |
| 6 | 5 | 10 | per Cent. on ditto.. Additional Duty | £100. :£20 ::£31.456 Ans. | 6.291 | | |
| | | | | | | 4769.178 | |
| | | | | | | 1.116 | |
| | | | | | | 28615068 | |
| | | | | | | 4769178 | |
| | | | | | | 4769178 | |
| | | | | | | 4769178 | |
| 35 | 1 | 9½ | per Cent. Supplies on Gross Sales | 15168.237:5322.402648::£100.. Answer | 35.89 | | |
| 1 | 1 | 0½ | per Cent. Gross Sales for New Exp. Duty | £100:£3 Exp Duty::£35.089.. Ans. | 1.089 | | |
| 7 | 17 | 1½ | To the Planter from Sugar sold to Amount of | £100..... | 7.860 | | |
| £.100 | 0 | 0 | | | | | 100.000 |

There is nothing more true, than that the goods shipped from Great-Britain to the old British colonies, except what is shipped to the Spanish main, or is sold to the Spaniards, who frequent the free ports, and who pay for the same in mules, cattle, mahogany, and dye woods, or in specie (the King's troops, the navy, the annual trading, and other ves-

sels, the custom-house officers, and a few others excepted) must be consumed by the planters of the different articles and residents here. There are no people here that live on rents, arising from any other part of the world, but from what they gain in the islands, and if the produce of the soil does not give them the means of paying for the

goods imported, the exportation of them from Britain must cease. The principal articles of export are sugar, rum, coffee, ginger, pimento, a small quantity of cotton, dye woods, and some small articles.—It appears by the Inspector-General's books, that during the years 1798, 1799, and 1800, the value of British manufactures exported to the old British colonies alone, in these three years, according to the Custom-house estimate, amounted to the sum of £10,683,120

| | |
|---|------------|
| This sum divided by three | 3,561,700 |
| The convoy duty has proved the same, about 70 per cent. under the actual value, for which add | 2,493,190 |
| Add supplies from Ireland | 200,000 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 6,254,890 |
| Add freight and insurance 12 per cent. | 750,588 |
| | <hr/> |
| | £7,005,478 |

If this amazing annual export was proportioned according to the relative value of the sugar imported from the old British colonies, with all the other produce received from them, it would be found that the sum of 4,205,401l. attached itself to sugar alone.—But suppose of this 7,005,478l. the Spanish and other trade, the King's forces by sea and land, the trading ships and other vessels, the coffee, cotton, ginger, pimento planters, the cutters of dye woods, the custom-house officers, and others not connected with agriculture, consume of it 4,505,478l. there then remains the sum of 2,500,000l., which annually attaches itself to sugar alone.—This being divided by 2,238,862 cwt. of sugar, the average quantity of that article imported in those three years, by the Inspector-General's books, makes the sum that attaches itself to each 1 cwt. 1l. 2s. 4d. consumed in British manufactures, consequently the fixing the duty on East-India sugar, in the making of which there is not one farthing's worth of British manufacture consumed, at only 2s. per cwt. more than on British colonial sugars, giving a bounty of 1l. 0s. 4d. per cwt. on it, to ruin the cultivators of it in the West-Indies, and to starve the manufacturers in Britain itself.—The same argument holds good with respect to the growers of coffee, cotton, ginger, pimento, and all the West-India productions, who consume the manufactures of Britain.—By M'Arthur's Financial and Political Facts, the whole exports from Great-Britain in the years

| | |
|----------|-----------------|
| 1798 was | £33,591,777 0 0 |
| 1799 .. | 35,991,392 0 0 |
| 1800 .. | 35,990,000 0 0 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 105,573,169 0 0 |

Making £35,191,056 6 8 the average annual export of those three years.

During the same period the exports to the old British West-India colonies alone is found to have been 10,685,120l. one-third of which taken as the average gives 3,561,706l. 13s. 4d. of annual export to those colonies, being nearly one-tenth of the whole export trade of the mother country, or as £9.88 is £100.

| | |
|---------------|----------------|
| 3,561,706.666 | 35,191,056.333 |
| | <hr/> |
| | £9.880 |

SIERRA LEONE PETITION.

SIR,—I venture to submit to your reconsideration the observations on the petition of the Sierra Leone Company. They appear to me not to be stated with your usual accuracy. I understand you thus: if the colony at Leone be supported, this country will incur the annual expense of 10,000l.; if it be abandoned, that expense will be saved. The first statement is true, the second is, in my opinion, inaccurate.—The majority of the inhabitants of this colony, consists of Maroons and Nova Scotia negroes, who have every claim upon this country for protection, and who, in justice, must be supported, whether the expense shall be 10 or 20,000l. a year. The story of the Maroons is so recent, that every one is familiar with the nature of their claims: some of your readers may not so well understand those of the Nova Scotia negroes. These people were the slaves of the Americans, and, in the American war, fought with us against their masters. From that country they were removed to Nova Scotia, and thence, by permission of the Company, to Sierra Leone. The witnesses who are examined as to the expense which must be incurred in removing, and resettling, and maintaining the negroes and Maroons, in case the colony should be abandoned, state; that, in their opinion, the expense of such a proceeding will amount to full or nearly the annual sum required by the Company. If this evidence be correct, it appears, that, although the colony should be abandoned, yet we must incur a very great expense; this part of the colony must be maintained somewhere; and the point for judgment,

on this petition, turns out to be this; how, and in what shape, this expense shall be incurred. Shall the money be expended in removing these people to some more favourable spot, with all the hazards and difficulties of a first establishment; or, shall the money be paid to the Company, and the negroes and Maroons be suffered to remain where they are, with the advantages of an established government, limited, indeed, and imperfect, but certainly better than no government at all.—There is, behind, another question, not of easy solution; with respect to the place to which the negroes and Maroons are to be removed, indeed, a variety of considerations press upon my mind; but I will not trespass further upon you: the events which have occurred in St. Domingo, and the spirit which is rising in Jamaica, give additional interest to the nature of our connexions with the coast of Africa.

R.

CONSPIRACY AGAINST BUONAPARTE.

Report of the Chief Justice to the First Consul.

CITIZEN FIRST CONSUL.—I think it my duty to separate from the information respecting the vile conspiracy, which public justice will shortly bring to public view and punish, those pieces of additional correspondence, which, in this great affair, and, as far as concerns the police, is but trifling; but, in its political point of view, seems to me of a nature that cannot fail to open the eyes of Europe to the despicable character of the English ministry, the meanness of its agents, and the miserable expedients it has recourse to, for accomplishing its views.—An English minister is accredited at a Court bordering on France: the manners of the people attach distinctions and privileges to this place, and not without reason. The residence of a Foreign Minister is every where designed for the ascertaining and maintaining those bonds of friendship, confidence, and honour, that unite states, and whose preservation constitutes the glory of a government, and the happiness of the people.—But these are not the views of the diplomatic agents of the British government. I shall lay before you, Citizen Consul, the direct correspondence which Mr. Drake, the English Ambassador to the Elector of Bavaria, has held for these 4 months with agents sent, paid, and employed by him in the heart of the Republic. This correspondence consists of 10 original letters, written in his own hand.—I shall also lay before you the instructions which that gentleman is charged to distribute to his agents, and an authentic account of the sums already paid, and of those promised, as an encouragement and reward of crimes, which the mildest laws every where punish with death. (See the instruction, and Nos. 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, of the correspondence.)—It was not as the representative of his Sovereign that Mr. Drake came to Munich, with the title of Plenipotentiary. This is merely his ostensible character, a pretence for

sending him: the genuine object of his mission is to recruit for agents of intrigue, revolt, and assassination; to stir up a war of plunder and murder against the French govt., and to wound the neutrality and the dignity of the govt. where he resides.—It is premised, though Mr. Drake appears ostensibly as a public character, he is in reality (as his private instructions prove) the secret director of English machinations on the Continent; the sinews of which are gold, corruption, the foolish hopes of those concerned in the plot, and of all the ambitious people in Europe. His aim is plainly pointed out in the 18 articles of instructions with which Mr. Drake furnishes his agents, and which form the first of the pieces added to this report—Nos. 2, 7, 8, 9, and 13 of these instructions, are sufficiently remarkable.—Art. 1. The principal point in view being the overthrow of the present govt., one of the principal means of accomplishing this is, the obtaining a knowledge of the plans of the enemy; for this purpose it is of the utmost importance to begin by establishing a correspondence in the different bureaux, for the obtaining particular information of all the plans, both as to the exterior as well as to the interior. The knowledge of these plans suggests the best mode of rendering them abortive, and the want of success is the most effectual means of discrediting the government, the first, and most important step towards the end proposed.—7. To gain over those employed in the powder-mills, so as to be able to blow them up, as occasion may require.—8. It is indispensably necessary to gain over a certain number of printers and engravers, that may be relied on, to print and execute every thing that the confederacy may stand in need of.—9. It is very much to be wished, that a perfect knowledge may be gained of the situation of the different parties in France, and particularly in Paris.—13. It is well understood, that every means must be tried to disorganize the armies, both in and out of the Republic.—Thus you see that the real objects of Mr. Drake's mission are to bring fire and flames into the Republic, to blow up the powder-mills, to procure trusty printers and engravers for the purposes of forgery, to penetrate into the heart of every assembly, to arm one party against the other; and, in fine, to disorganize the armies. But, happily, this evil genius is not so powerful in its means, as it is fertile in illusions and sinister projects; were it otherwise, there would be an end of society. Hatred, craft, gold, and a total indifference as to the means employed, are neither wanting to Mr. Drake nor the immoral policy of the govt. whose agent he is. But they do not possess power enough to shake the organization of France, which is of the strongest nature, having its foundation in the affections of millions of citizens, cemented together by their joint strength and interest, and animated by the wisdom and genius of the govt.—Those who consider nothing of any value besides gold, whose only abilities consist in low intrigue, are not able to conceive the strength and power of a combination of circumstances, the result of 10 years of sufferings, and 10 years of victories, of a concurrence of events, and of the establishment of a noble nation founded on the dangers and efforts of a glorious war, and a terrible revolution.—In the midst of these means, Mr. Drake sees nothing but oppor-

inities for intrigue, and the efforts of spies. During my stay in Italy," he says to one of his correspondents, (Munich, Jan. 27, No. 7.) "I had connexions with the interior of France:—I should continue to have them, as I am at this moment, of all the English Ministers, the nearest to the frontiers."—This is his pretence for exercising his utmost endeavours for the overthrow of France. But his means are no better than his right.—He has agents in whom he dares not confide. His doubtful correspondents write to him *via* Swisserland, Strasburg, Kehl, Offenbourg, and Munich. He has subalterns in these cities, to take especial care of his correspondence. He makes use of forged passports (No. 835) of fictitious names, of sympathetic ink. (No. 1.) These are the modes of communication through which he transmits his ideas, projects, and rewards; and, by these means, he is informed of the schemes planned by his orders for raising insurrection, in the first place, in 4 departments; (No. 7), for raising an army, increasing the number of the disaffected, and overthrowing the Consular Govt.—These efforts and promises are too mad, and the vile miserable methods employed are too disproportioned to the difficulties of the enterprize, to give any uneasiness as to their success. But it is not with regard to what may occasion fear, nor with a view of punishing, that the operations of that interior arrangement, called the policy acts; its principal object is, not to prevent crimes as that of the exterior is to confine ambition, but to remove even the very occasion of vice and weakness.—In those countries that are the best governed, there are always to be found certain persons who suffer themselves to be led astray by a sort of innate inconstancy. In the best regulated commonwealths there are to be found perverse and weak men. It has always been considered by my predecessors as a duty to watch over such persons, not in the vain hope of rendering them good, but to stop the development of their vices; and as, on this head, all civilized nations have the same interest to watch over, and the same duty to fulfil, it has always been a received maxim, that no govt. should suffer a standard to be created, around which hirelings of every country or profession might gather, for the purpose of planning a general disorganization, and much less should they permit an infamous school of bribery, and recruiting, to the prejudice at once of the fidelity, constancy, affections, and confidence of the citizens.—Mr. Drake had an agency in Paris; but other Ministers, the instruments of record, and excitors of mischief, like him, may have agencies. Mr. Drake, in his correspondence, unmasks all those that exist in France, by the very measures he takes to deny that he knows any thing of them. "I repeat," (says he, Nos. 4, 6, 8, and 9) "that I have no knowledge of the existence of any other society besides yours. But I repeat to you, (he observes in several places) that if there does, I do not doubt but that your hands will take the necessary measures, not only to embarrass one another, but to be mutually unavailing to each other." In fine, he adds, (Munich, Dec. 9, 1803) with a brutal fury, and worthy the part he plays—"It is of very little consequence by whom the beast is brought to the pound, it is sufficient that you are all ready to be in the chace."—Pursuant to this system, on the first breaking out of the conspiracy, that now employs the hand of justice, he writes: "If you have any means of extricating any of Georges' associates, do not fail to make use of them;" (No. 9),

and as his evil genius is never discouraged, even in his disgrace, Mr. Drake will not have his friends give themselves up for lost in this unexpected reverse of fortune.—"I earnestly request you," he writes (Munich, 25 Feb. 1804, No. 9), "to print and distribute a short address to the army, immediately (both to the officers and soldiers.) The main point is to gain partisans in the army; for I am thoroughly persuaded, that it is through the army alone that one can reasonably hope to gain the change so much desired."—How vain these hopes were, is sufficiently characterized by the striking unanimity that prevails every where, now that the danger is discovered with which France was menaced.—But the attempt to commit a crime, the bare idea of which is an outrage to humanity, and the execution of which would not only have been a national calamity, but, I may add, a calamity for all Europe, demands not only a reparation for the past, but a guarantee for the future.—A solitary, scattered banditti, a prey to want, without harmony, and without support, is always weaker than the laws which are to punish it, or the police which ought to intimidate it. But if they have the power of uniting, if they could correspond with each other, and the brigands of other countries, if in a profession the most honourable of all, inasmuch as the tranquillity of Empires and the honour of Sovereigns depend thereon, there should be found men authorized to make use of all the power their situation affords, to practise vice, corruption, infamy, and villainy, and to raise from out of the refuse of human nature, an army of assassins, rebels, and forgers, under the command of the most immoral and most ambitious of all governments, there would be no security in Europe for the existence of any state, for public morality, nor even for the continuance of the principles of civilization.—It is not my duty to discuss the means you may possess to secure Europe, by guaranteeing her against such dangers. I content myself with informing and proving to you, that there exists at Munich an Englishman, called Drake, invested with a diplomatic character, who, profiting of this guise, and of the vicinity of that place, directs dark and criminal efforts to the heart of the Republic; who recruits for agents of corruption and rebellion; who resides beyond the environs of the town, that his agents may have access to him without shame, and depart, without being exposed; and who directs and pays men in France, charged by him with paving the way to an overthrow of the govt.—This new species of crime, escaping, from its nature, the ordinary means of suppression, which the laws put in my power, I must confine myself to the unmasking it to you, and pointing out to you at the same time, the sources, circumstances, and consequences. Health and respect.

REGNIER.

INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO M. D. L.

The substance of these instructions is as follows:—I. M. D. L. must immediately go to France, and, without penetrating as far as Paris, must find an opportunity of conversing with his associates, whom he must inform that, having the highest opinion of their prudence, the purity of their intentions, and their patriotism, they may be furnished with pecuniary assistance, to enable them to overthrow the present govt., and the French nation; to choose the form of govt., most likely to assure its happiness and tranquillity; a point which 10 years experience ought to have rendered very obvious.—II. M. D. L. must settle upon a general plan with his associates: containing—

The particulars as to the mode of execution which they intend successively to adopt.—2. An estimate of the probable expense, without losing sight of economy.—3. The probable period when it may be necessary to advance the sum in question.—III. M. D. L. will remit 5000 *sterl.* to enable them to commence their operations: whenever the sum is expended, or nearly so, the same amount will be again furnished by M. D. L.—IV. It is wished, that a bulletin should be made out of all those interesting events that occur, on which the French papers are silent, as also of all those that take place in the sea-ports and the army. The associates to give a very exact account of their hopes, and of the success of their operations. These bulletins must be numbered very exactly, that, in case it should happen that any one of them should be mislaid, or withdrawn, it may be immediately perceived, and notice given to the society.—These bulletins must also be written according to the nature of their contents, partly with black ink, and partly with sympathetic ink, for which M. D. L. will give them the receipt.—Those of which part is to be written with sympathetic ink, will be marked by a small spot of ink, made as if by chance, at the top of the first page of the letter. It is absolutely necessary that M. D. L. and his associates procure the means of being informed of every thing interesting that passes in the departments of the different Ministers, as well as in the Senates in Council, in the interior of the palace, &c., for should these bulletins not be exact, confidence might take the alarm, and be weakened.—V. M. D. L. will be himself the centre point of the correspondence.—VI. As soon as M. D. L. has agreed with his companions on all these points, he shall immediately go to the place of his destination.

ADDITIONS TO THE INSTRUCTIONS.

I. It appears more eligible, that M. D. L. should go to Paris, or the environs, where the police will have it less in their power to watch one who knows how to conceal himself, than to any other place, where every new face is taken notice of, and where every mayor is informed of all arrivals, and makes a merit of giving notice thereof, besides the suspicion which may arise from coming and going, and the carriage of letters, which may also eventually be intercepted. It is also much better to speak to each person separately, as the freedom of conversation allows of much which might not so conveniently be committed to writing.—II. The object of M. D. L.'s journey being the overthrow of the present govt., the best means of effecting it is, to obtain a knowledge of the plan of the enemy. For this purpose it is of the utmost consequence to establish a confidential correspondence with the different offices, for gaining an exact knowledge of all plans, both within and without the Republic. The knowledge of these plans will furnish the best means of defeat, and their failure is a certain means of discrediting the govt., the first and most important step towards the end desired. For this purpose means must be devised to obtain certain intelligence in the Sec. of War and Marine's Offices; as also in those of Foreign Affairs and Public Worship: means must also be found to know what passes in the Secret Committee, which is supposed to be established at St. Cloud, and composed of the Consul's most confidential friends. These notices ought to be given in the form of Bulletins, according to the instructions of the President of the Committee, and sent with all possible expedition to M. D. L. (Drake) in the manner

agreed on. Care must be taken to give an account of the different projects, that B. . . . may have with regard to Ireland and Turkey, and of the plots of the Irish refugees. These points are most particularly recommended to M. D. L. as the first and most important in the beginning; also of the removal of troops, vessels, those building, and all the military preparations.—The letters to be addressed to a friend at Strasburg, and from thence to be brought by him to the Post-Office at Kehl.—When there is a great deal to be written, it may be done on the back of one or more maps, with sympathetic ink; or on the margin of books printed upon paper well sized, taking care to make a mark with ink, where the writing begins: this must be sent by a post-coach, addressed to Mad. Franck, or Messrs. Papelier and Co. at Strasburg, with a letter signed with the name of some bookseller, where they will request the correspondents to forward it to Mr. D. These correspondents being in the habit of executing commissions for M. D. will never have the smallest suspicion of the affair, these being common articles in trade; but this must never be done, except when there is a great deal to write, or when the quantity of paper would otherwise be so considerable, as to awaken suspicion at the Post-Office, and then M. D. must be informed of it by letter. This manner of sending, has nothing remarkable in it, as the parcels will always be marked A. B. with a letter for Mad. Franck, or Messrs. Papelier.—III. Care must be taken to furnish M. D. with an estimate of the necessary expenses making the demand as early as possible, and explaining the different objects. M. D. must be informed of the fictitious name of the person in whose favour the Bill of Exchange must be drawn; and M. D. will take care to procure one where his name will not appear, and which will not be liable to any suspicion.—IV. To render the correspondence more secure, fictitious names must be used, even with the sympathetic ink; also for the names of the towns, which must be taken one for another, according to the list marked A.—V. That no suspicion may arise from the same name being always used, M. D. L. will agree with six at least of his faithful friends about changing it. This measure is indispensably necessary in case of sickness or accidents. Each of these gentlemen in waiting, must very exactly observe the order of the number of the first series, as if one person alone had written. That which is intelligible (*in clare*) must be relative to commerce, or the arts and sciences, and must appear as if it was an account of the novelties in Paris. If the govt. is spoken of, it must be in a favourable manner. Care must be taken that what is written with the sympathetic ink may not be too small. The numbers must always be written with it, and never plain, to avoid suspicion.—VI. M. D. L. having received from M. V. the receipt for the sympathetic ink, must destroy the bottle, that he may not bring any thing into France that can occasion the least suspicion, and must write his private instructions on blank paper in his pocket-book at the end of his travelling expenses, &c. and must destroy all papers as well as passports, which can throw the least light upon his destination.—VII. One may, with the associates, buy over those employed in the powder mills, for the purpose of blowing them up, as may be found convenient.—VIII. It is above all necessary to take into pay some printers and engravers, who can be relied on, for the purpose of printing what the association may find necessary.—IX.



It is very desirable to be informed of the state of the parties in France, particularly in Paris, and of the probable result of the death of the King.—X. For the present, nothing must be talked of in the Committee, except to those who are known to be well disposed, at least till something certain is known as to the intentions of the King, and the general disposition of the people, after which, new instructions must be sent, tending to the proposed end; and which must be calculated according to the tokens received.—XI. The greatest circumspection must be used, particularly in the first movements, and in not speaking without the greatest reserve, to avoid the treachery of false brethren, who might profit thereby, to lay claims to the favour of the govt. In no case must any thing be confided, except to men of the greatest prudence. One means of sounding the opinion of doubtful persons, is naturally to observe that, if it is impossible to have a Republic, it seems more simple, and just, to restore the ancient royalty, than to devote one's self anew to the despotism of a stranger.—XII. M. D. advises M. D. L. not to leave France without pressing necessity, on account of the difficulty of passing and repassing the frontiers.—XIII. It is well understood, that all possible means must be tried to disorganize the armies, both within and without the Republic.—XIV. Endeavours must be made to establish a direct correspondence with England, by way of Jersey, or from some point of the French coast, the way might also be found to establish a correspondence *via* Holland and Embden. In the meanwhile, when any thing very interesting occurs, the letters may be addressed to Mr. Harwood, under cover to Messrs. Herberger and Co. of Hamburg; but as this way becomes more uncertain, care must then be taken to send a duplicate to M. D. In case it should be possible to communicate with the Commander of Jersey, M. D. L. will write under a fictitious name, and the Government of Jersey will receive his instructions from the English govt.—XV. M. D. L. will give M. D. as soon as possible, the address which M. D. must put in writing to him at Paris.—XVI. M. D. L. must address the letters for the present to Mr. L'Abbé De Meuse, *conseiller ecclésiastique à Munich*.—XVII. M. D. L. will acquaint M. D. with the marks by which he may understand the paragraphs published in the *Journal Français*.—XVIII. In case it should be necessary to send any of the associates to M. D. notice of it must be given to him beforehand, and an answer must be waited for at Augsburg, in which M. D. will appoint the place of rendezvous.

| REAL NAMES OF PERSONS. | | FICTITIOUS NAMES. |
|------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| M. D. | Leriget. | Alternately. |
| | Albert. | |
| | Aubry. | |
| M. D. L. | D'Ussel. | Alternately. |
| | Dubard. | |
| | Legrand. | |
| Moreau. | M. Pellissier. | |
| Pichegru. | M. Dumbry. | |
| Talleyrand. | M. Bease. | |
| | M. Loiselet. | |
| | Madame Justine. | |
| | C. Auguste. | |
| | C. Haumont. | |
| | M. Douyet. | |
| | M. Clément. | |
| | M. Rissac. | |
| | M. Bouchereau. | |
| | M. Morin. | |
| | M. Lacodre. | |

| | |
|------------|---------------|
| Massena | M. Arnaud. |
| Moreau | M. Husson. |
| Pichegru | M. Sauvaigne. |
| Talleyrand | M. Grenier. |

| REAL NAMES OF CITIES. | | FICTITIOUS NAMES. |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Arbois | Douay. | |
| Basle | Metz. | |
| Besançon | Blois. | |
| Bologne | Rheims. | |
| Chambery | Tours. | |
| Corse (La) | The Upper Palatinate. | |
| Ferrara | Perpignan. | |
| Florence | Berlin. | |
| Geneva | Besançon. | |
| Landau | Mons. | |
| Leghorn | Saumur. | |
| London | Bordeaux. | |
| Lyon | Rennes. | |
| Mantua | Montpellier. | |
| Milan | Ingolstadt. | |
| Modena | Nantes. | |
| Naples | Dresden. | |
| Paris | Châlons. | |
| Rhin [The] | Le Village. | |
| Rome | Lubec. | |
| Strasbourg | Toulouse. | |
| Turin | Epernay. | |
| Venice | Ulm. | |
| Verona | Passau. | |
| Vienna | Florence. | |

| REAL NAMES OF OBJECTS. | | FICTITIOUS NAMES. |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Ambassador | The Wax. | |
| English [the government] | M. Jacob. | |
| Money | The Basis. | |
| Armistice | The Chariot. | |
| Legislative Body | The Physicians. | |
| Courier [the] | The Merchandize. | |
| Jacobin [a] | A Man of Letters. | |
| Insurrection [an] | A Manufactory. | |
| Letters or Dispatches | The Newspapers. | |
| Officers [the] | The Domestics. | |
| Peace [the] | The Post. | |
| Police [the] | M. Jailleu. | |
| Prefect [the] | M. Lambert. | |
| Proclamation [a] | A Drummer. | |
| Re-establishment of Royalty [the] | The New Calendar. | |
| King [the] | The Resort. | |
| Conservative Senate [the] | The Bank. | |
| Soldiers [the] | The Labourers. | |
| Tribunate [the] | The Artists. | |
| Three Consuls [the] | The Family. | |
| Provisions [the] | The Utensils. | |

[The agent, M. D. L. having been sent from England to Bavaria, there to receive Mr. Drake's instructions before he commenced his operations, announced to him by a note his arrival at Munich; to which he received an answer, which we think highly proper to print, because it is written in his own hand, and signed by him; and because the whole of the following correspondence, which we here present to our readers, is from the same hand:]

SIR,—I am extremely happy to hear of your arrival in this city, and shall be very happy to see you as soon as convenient to you. You will do me the honour to stay and dine with me, if 4 o'clock will be convenient to you. Yours, &c.

Munich, Friday morn.

FRANCIS DRAKE.

The agent being arrived in Paris, immediately saw that there was nothing to be done; however, he did not cease to supply Mr. Drake with letters and bulletins for his money, but he also let the police into the secret of this correspondence.]

[CORRESPONDENCE.] No. I. 30th Oct. 1803.

I have just received your's of the 24th, and I congratulate you heartily on your safe arrival in good health at Toulouse [Strasbourg]. I hope to have some news of Mr. Loiselet [Bonaparte] soon, as I do not doubt your being now at Chalons [Paris].—There is nothing in your letter which requires any observations of mine, except touching the money. On this subject I beg you to recollect, that I requested of you to give me beforehand an estimate of your probable expenses. You received at Bourdeaux [London] before your departure, 500 l. for the general wants of the association, 200 l. for your travelling expenses, &c. to the 15th Nov. to which I have added 50 l. making together 750 l. Before this is expended, you will no doubt send me the particulars of your expenditure for my gov. and you may depend upon my punctuality.—I have this moment received a letter for you from our president, under date 11th Oct. of which I here transmit you the copy, not choosing to run the risk of sending you the original. I do not understand it, because there are cyphers in it, to which you have given me no key.—You may very easily cause minutes of letters to be taken, being attentive to whom you confide this important trust.—You will do well to inform your friend at Toulouse [Strasbourg] that when he takes my letters to the Post-office, he will do well to burn the covers.—I have just made trial of a new way of writing, which consists in dipping the pen alternately into the sympathetic ink, and a glass of water. By this means the writing is not so visible on the paper, and becomes afterwards equally legible on applying the liquor. I adopt this method in writing you this: I request you will inform me if it succeeds. Adieu, take care of yourself, and let me hear from you soon.

Copy of the President's Letter. Dated Oct. 11, 1803.
Since your departure, Sir, we have made general trials of the solution of salt, of which you have the receipt; and we have observed, that if it be admirable for certain wounds and contusions, there are nevertheless cases where it may be hurtful, as you may have perceived. For example, it must not be used when it is necessary to operate on 44, 31, 44, 48, 102, (a 23, 13, 12, 22, 7, 10) generally Goulard, a little strong, suffices, and is not subject to the same inconveniences, but the saline solution is the only remedy that can be applied with success when it is necessary to operate on 303, 15, 40, 10, (39, 13, 37, 44, 31, 49, &c.) 44, 26, 38, 27, 6, 20, 37, (34, 19, 26, 27, 10, 24, 2,) incorporates itself, thoroughly with (37, 8, 13, 43, 16); in all cases you must for the future use the elixir without any mixture of water, of which we have given you a bottle, and which may be justly termed *Baume de vie*, for its inventor pretends, that it will raise the dead to life. You may give these instructions with all confidence to those surgeons or apothecaries you may happen to employ; I hope that, with God's help, our saline solution will ultimately make as much noise in the world, as the Vaccine Inoculation.—I keep in reserve several 34, 41, 1, (43, 37,) (43, 37,) which will send you in proper time and place. I desire you will not fail to acquaint me of the receipt of this letter. I need not tell you with how much impatience we wait the particulars of your journey. Adieu. D. V.—Do not forget to recommend to the compilers of 38, 24, 23, 27, 10, 12, 8, 43, 37, to write them always to

3, 4, 2, 40, 10 | of the second and of the 3d
4, 4, 31, 40, 13 | of the 30, 36, 43, 33, 35, 10, 24, 2.

No. II. Nov. 14, 1803.—I have just received yours of the 3d. I must lose no time in acquainting you. The ink was legible in 2 or 3 places of the letter; perhaps you have brought the sheet too near to the other composition: nevertheless, there was not any word that was legible. I observe that the post-mark of the letter was Strasbourg; would it not be better, that your friends at Strasbourg put the letters into the Post-office at Kehl? for one ought not to trust to the Post-office of the former city. I wait with impatience your report of the particulars of the conferences you mention, as also of the arrangements which you have made. Instead of the address you have hitherto used, I beg you to make use of first 14 addresses, which you will find at the foot of this, taking care to use them alternately, and to change the seal and alter the hand very frequently. You may, for the future, address your letters, under cover, to "Mr. Lindemann, Post-office, at Munich," where you may recommend them to the care of the servant of the Post-office; not to give rise to the least misunderstanding on this point, I here subjoin a form of each of the 3 methods which you must use alternately.—First Method.—"To Mons. Jacob Reiberg, recommended to the care of Mons. Lindemann, of the Post-office at Munich."—Second Method.—"To Mons. Lindemann, Post-office, at Munich, to be transmitted to M. Pierre Straulino, Merchant."—Third Method.—"To Mrs. Cramer, at Munich," and afterwards put it under cover, addressed to "Mr. Lindemann."—N. B. Take care never to write upon your letters, to be forwarded to M. D." It is not only unnecessary, but may excite suspicion.—The following are the addresses which you must, for the future, alternately use for your letters; at the same time putting them under cover, and addressing them to the care of Mr. Lindemann:

1. M. Jacob Reiberg.—2. M. Pierre Straulino, Merchant.—3. Mrs. Cramer.—4. M. Grasselli.—5. Dr. Strocher.—6. Rev. Father Waldsegg.—7. Counsellor Fischer.—8. Miss Jaxis.—9. M. de Zucher, Physician.—10. Count de Westerholt.—11. Counsellor Muller.—12. Mr. de Kirschbaum.—13. Mr. Schellenberg.—14. Miss de Schneit.—That your letters may never miscarry, you may, if you think proper, make them somewhat heavier, paying additional postage.—Accept, Sir, the assurances of my particular friendship.

No. III.—*Copy of a Letter from Mr. Drake to Mr. Obraskow, with the post-mark of Munich—Dec. 30, 1803.*—Sir, I duly received your's of the 16th ult. but late, as it ought to have come to hand the 24th of the same month. There are several passages in it that are scarcely legible; among others, where you write about money. To avoid a like inconvenience for the future, request of you to avoid using water for soaking your pen. I also received one of your favours the 28th of last month, as also two bulletins since that, but all three without being dated or numbered, so that I am not certain whether your correspondence comes immediately to hand. I therefore recommend this point as very essential to the regularity of our communications. I hope you received my No. 2, and request you will inform me, if I ought to continue to make use of the same address and channel. In this case you will instruct your friends at Toulouse (Strasbourg) to ask for my letters at the post-office when they put in yours. Respecting the sending a person to Switzerland, to take care of your correspondence with the

army, I do not see any objection to this measure. But never lose sight of the maxim I here inculcate; which is, never to multiply the ramifications of the project, because you thereby multiply the chances of a discovery; and that all confidence bestowed, which is not strictly and absolutely necessary to the plan, is not only useless, but dangerous. For the rest, I hope that nothing will be done precipitately, and that they will not begin to act till a plan of operations be settled, which should all move forward together towards the proposed end. All partial and unconnected measures are good for nothing, and must necessarily end in defeat.—I wish much to know who the members are that compose your committee, and, above all, the character, talents, opinions, and designs of him whom you have fixed on for your chief; but I am at the same time sensible that this communication cannot be made till you have a safe opportunity for Toulouse (Strasbourg), as it would be risking too much to trust to the post. Although the two bulletins were in fact very barren of information, I doubt not that, in consequence of the measures you have taken, they will in future become interesting. It is of the utmost importance that you should be thoroughly informed of what is passing in the bureau, as your views can never be promoted, if you are ignorant of those of the consular gov., and you will remember, that I have often repeated it to you, that one of the best methods of attacking that gov., and consequently of promoting your end, is to be enabled to counteract them.—As to the proposition of the door-keeper, you must not expect that I agree positively to it, unless the utility thereof becomes more certain. All that I can promise on that head is, that he shall be recompensed according to the services he may render: for the rest, you may inform me what he asks, also as to the notes of which you spoke to him.—Respecting the mode of accounting, I must inform you, that I have no one that I can send to you at present: you will therefore keep to the provisional method which you have already pointed out, while I am waiting for instructions from the president. I am ready to transmit you, for yourself, 100*l.* in any mode you may point out, for two months salary, up to the 15th Feb.; and as your demand for travelling expenses seems to me very just, I do not doubt but they will be allowed; but you will have the goodness to let me know the amount.—I was not able to decypher thoroughly what you wish to observe, respecting the printing, as several phrases in that part of your letter were not legible. I shall therefore refrain from speaking to you on that head, till I have received more certain information about it.—With regard to recompensing the agents in the different offices, I have no difficulty in furnishing the 200 *Louis* which you ask for that purpose, as soon as you inform me that they are able to make themselves useful.—I again repeat my charge to you, to hurry nothing rashly on. Fix your plan; calculate and arrange your mode of acting, chuse your agents, and when this preliminary point is settled, it will then be time to begin the execution of your projects.—Adieu! Believe me to be, with the most sincere sentiments of esteem and consideration, your very humble servant, *NOTA MANUS.*

No. IV.—9 Dec. 1803.—Sir, I have just received yours of the 26th ult. and take the earliest opportunity of assuring you, in the most formal manner, that I have not the least knowledge of the society of whose existence your society does not

seem to doubt. For the rest, should the fact be established, and you convinced that its aim is in unison with yours, I do not hesitate to exhort you to use all your address and discretion to combine your operations, so as not only not to throw any obstacles in the way of the labours and enterprises of this latter, but to favour them, and endeavour to ensure their success, which, as I think, will essentially help to promote the result of your own operations. I am fully persuaded that it will not be difficult to render this argument agreeable to your committee, according to this supposition.—I repeat to you, in the most pointed terms, that I have no knowledge of the existence of this society; but I also repeat, that if it does in reality exist, I have not the least doubt that you and your friends will take proper measures, not only not to embarrass, but to aid its operations. It is of little consequence by whom the game is hunted down; it is sufficient that you be all ready to join in the chase.—The other objects which you mention, shall be taken into immediate consideration; and I will take care to send you the necessary instructions. In the mean-time, I must observe to you, that I cannot finally resolve, without having a clearer view, and more circumstantial detail of the resources and means of the person whom you qualify with the title of general, and which the chiefs of your association may possess, as also the manner in which they intend to employ them.—A very essential remark which I have just made is, that the heat of the Spanish wax renders the sympathetic ink visible; I therefore particularly recommend to you, not to use it, but to close your letters simply with wafers.—Believe me to be, with the most perfect consideration, Sir, yours, &c. *NOTA MANUS.*

No. V.—27 Dec. 1803.—Sir, Your favours of the 28th Nov. and 5th Dec. are come to hand, the first on the 11th, and the second on the 19th of this month; as are the two bulletins No. 4 (which ought to have been No. 5 and 6). My answer was ready on the 21st, and was copied; but not having been able to procure the bills of exchange with which it ought to have been accompanied, and which I was obliged to procure from Augsburg, I was compelled to defer sending it till this moment. I now consider the sending it as useless, since it chiefly turned on subjects on which it is no longer necessary to speak now, after having received yours of the 15th, which came to hand this morning with the bulletin No. 7. Both of them were perfectly well written, being extremely legible, and there was not the least appearance of the ink before the application of the composition.—You account very naturally for the delay which one of your letters experienced. I do not doubt but that the letter you gave to the man at Toulouse (Strasbourg) will produce every thing we can wish for. I think you would do well to promise him a reward, to encourage him to be still more exact in putting your letters into the post-office at Kehl, and to be very diligent in fetching mine, which I shall continue to address to Obieskow. As to the uneasiness you express in yours of the 26th and 28th Nov. I will here give you my sentiments. I wish very much, for reasons you are not ignorant of, that you should remain at Chalons (Paris); but if you have reason to think your further stay there might expose you to the danger of discovery, or if you think it necessary or expedient to quit France wholly, (which I leave entirely to your own prudence and discernment) you are quite at liberty to do it,

taking care to send duplicates of your papers to your friends, to enable them to continue your correspondence, pointing out to them, at the same time, the means of sending their letters and receiving mine. In this case I recommend your going to Offenbourg, and there to wait my last instructions. I am perfectly satisfied with the account you give me of the members of your committee; and I do not desire to know the names of the persons, unless you think such communication may be made without any inconvenience, or danger of offending your friends. I cannot conceive how any of its members could doubt our seriously intending to help them in attacking the usurper, particularly as all your instructions tend to that end, which, with the reports of the conversation you have had with me, will, I hope, suffice to disabuse them. You know I have never recommended to you to direct all your attention to learning what B——'s projects are, but through that perfect conviction that I am in, that it is one of the most efficacious means of sapping the foundation of the greatness of that man. For the rest, you may renew your assurances to them, that the principal point shall be pursued by me without any remissness, and in the like manner, most conformable to your original institutions; but it is for your committee to determine in what degree they are practicable, considering the situation of affairs, and dispositions of persons in the interior.—As I have touched on the subject, I shall add, by way of answer to an article in one of your last bulletins, that I know very well that every thing is decided in the secret cabinet of St. Cloud; but that I also know that the measures and execution must necessarily be confided to the bureaux, and that they are consequently able to furnish a very exact idea of what is doing and what may be done.—I have not the smallest knowledge of Mr. Talon: and I repeat to you, I have no connexion with any agency in Paris, except your's. I do not say I have no correspondence. I must have that, to be the better enabled to ascertain their exactness of the reports, by comparing them with one another.—Your committees may make use of the channel of J. for transmitting his advices immediately to Bourdeaux (London), in the manner which you speak in your's of the 5th, but only in these pressing cases. You will easily imagine that it would be imprudent to run the risk of losing this channel for the future, through trifles. You informed me, in one of your preceding letters, that you intended sending me some notes respecting the door-keeper.—It was those that I alluded to, and not to the contents of the famous pocket-book. It is necessary to ascertain, 1st. if it contains all the secret papers of 2dly. What price he sets upon his undertaking. Enclosed you will find drafts for 10,000 livres, 2,400 of which are for yourself, on account of your salary, and 7,600 livres for the use of the committee. I request that you will make me an acknowledgment for the same. You may depend upon my not forgetting your travelling expenses, concerning which I shall shortly write you.—I will send you, by the first courier, a letter written by B. . . . to an Englishman. If your committee think proper, they may have it printed and circulated in Paris: it is a little too long, but some paragraphs might be retrenched. I do not know whether I shall receive in time, for this post, the 4th draft for 2,500 livres; in case it do not arrive, you shall

certainly receive it by to-morrow's.—Believe me to be, your's, &c.

NOTA MANUS.

No. VI.—3 Jan. 1804.—Sir, The bulletin, No. VIII. is come safe to hand, and it is with pleasure that I find your correspondence becomes daily more interesting. I hope you received my last, enclosing a bill of exchange for 10,000 French livres.—I must inform you that an emissary of the French gov. has just made some enquiries at the post-office at Rastadt, concerning a correspondence which it is supposed exists between me and the disaffected in France; but from the manner in which he executed his commission, it is very certain that the Fr. gov't. has not the smallest idea of ours. It was the appearance of the letter of an Englishman to Buonaparté in almost all the departments, that gave rise to the suspicion that the letter came from hence. For the rest, I only mention this incident to set your mind at ease in case you should hear any thing about it there.—If any circumstances should arise to cause you to quit France, I earnestly recommend you, before your departure, to arrange every thing concerning the expediting of the bulletin of your committee; to this end you would do well to concert measures with the friend at Toulouse (Strasbourg), that they may pass immediately to your hands at Offenbourg, so that they may be delivered into your hands in this city, or that a trusty person may be charged with them, or that you go yourself to Kehl to fetch them. I have not the smallest reason to suspect the post-office at Kehl; nevertheless there is no occasion to make use of it when we can dispense with it.—I have just had an interview with a person lately arrived from Chalons (Paris), from whom I learn, that the First Consul becomes every day more and more extravagant; that the reign of terror is re-establishing rapidly; that his violent conduct announces sufficiently that he is perfectly easy as to his own situation; in short, that all that passes presages something remarkable, more or less, at a distance. It is evident, that the invasion of England embarrasses him greatly: for though he pretends to be resolutely determined upon it, yet is he sensible of, and fears the danger of it, without knowing well how to recede. I beg of you to give all your attention to this situation of affairs, the which (according to the person from whom I heard these remarks) must bring things, sooner or later, to a definitive crisis.—I have not the least knowledge of what is passing in La Vendée. It is unnecessary for me here to repeat my opinion, that any unconnected plans, or which are not fully united to the general and fixed one, must always produce evil. Nevertheless I am inclined to view all these insurrections as spontaneous, and arising solely from the opposition of the inhabitants to the measure of the conscription.—One article of your instructions was, a recommendation, not to let a week pass without writing twice, but not to make too great use of our mode of communication. I believe it will be better never to write, but when something interesting presents itself. Believe me to be, &c.

NOTA MANUS.

4 Jan.—At the moment I was closing this, I received your's of the 25th ult. with a bulletin of the same date, both interesting on account of the information they contain.—I once more assure you, in the most solemn manner, that I know nothing of the committee you speak of; and after considering the account you give of it, I can

scarcely advise you to have any concern with it. I do not lose sight of the account you gave me of Willot and the others — You have discovered the just proportion of the ingredients for the composition of your ink: your letters do not present the smallest appearance of disguise.

No. VII.—*Munich, 27 Jun. 1804.*—Sir, I have received, more or less regularly, the three bulletins, No. 10. of the 28th Dec. No. 12 of the 5th Jan. and No. 13 of the same date. Your favours of the 4th and 5th of Jan. are also come to hand, also that of the 12th Jan. No. 11, never came to hand; but I can draw no inference, except that the transcriber has, by mistake, marked No. 12 the bulletin, which ought to have been No. 11. It will, nevertheless, be very proper to ascertain, whether this supposition is true, in order to remove all doubt on this point.—I informed you in my last, that the consular govt. had some suspicions of my correspondence with the interior of France. To this is to be attributed the insertion in the *Moniteur*, No. 115, of this year, of an article, in the form of a note of pretended news from London, of Jan. 2, mentioning the arrival of an extraordinary courier from Munich, the preceding day. This is a palpable falsehood: for the rest, it is not the first time that the First Consul has employed this manoeuvre, since he made use of it soon after my arrival at Munich, as may be seen in the *Moniteur* No. 101, of the 1st of Jan. 1803. It appears that his suspicions arise from very vague foundations. He knows, that, during my residence in Italy, I had connexions with the interior of France, and so he supposes the same exists at present, and the more so, as I am, at this moment, one of those English ministers who is at the least distance from the frontiers. It is nevertheless very plain that, notwithstanding the pains taken to induce belief that a correspondence existed between me and the disaffected in the interior, that the consular govt. has not acquired the smallest indication that can lead to a doubt even of our correspondence; in that case it would not have had the clue which might have led to greater discoveries afterwards, by publishing articles which ought to put us on our guard, and engage us, in case of necessity, to change the channel of our communication to defeat their calculation.—The means which it had recourse to in Germany, in order to make discoveries, have not succeeded, and I have just received correct intelligence, that the emissary I mentioned to you would not obtain the least news any where.—You may, therefore, make yourself perfectly easy on that head.—I nevertheless recommend to you, not to write either the date or place with common ink in your letters or bulletins, but with sympathetic ink; you will easily guess the reason, without my pointing it out. I hear of all these partial and unconnected movements you mention, with the greatest concern; and I am of your opinion, that they can have no other effect than that of causing govt. to double its vigilance, and induce it to adopt severe measures, which will be very fatal to many valuable persons, who might have rendered us essential services, had they been better employed.—The fate of the committee which you mention in your letter of the 5th, the existence of which I learnt from you, will no doubt serve to put you on your guard against false brethren, and render you very circumspect to whom you confide your whole secret. The grand art of carrying on a similar operation to that with which

you are charged, consists in confiding to each exactly what appertains to the part which he has to act, and no more.—As to the desire which your general has expressed (according to the bulletin, No. 13), to have an idea of the epoch when the operations should begin, I answer, that it must depend upon the ideas entertained respecting the progress of your operations. According to yours of the 15th Dec. you propose to yourself the exciting a commotion in 4 departments on a fixed day; but I doubt whether this measure, if unsupported elsewhere, will produce any great effect. It might cause a temporary embarrassment to the First Consul, but it appears to me impossible, that it should in the end succeed, if B.'s army is at his disposal, or if one is not previously assured of the concurrence of a good part of his troops.—I request of you to inform me what we have to rely on in this one particular, that I may be able to regulate my ideas and calculations, and our proceedings thereon. In my opinion, the grand point is to gain as many partisans as possible in the army, for I am firmly of opinion, that it is by their means alone that we can reasonably hope to be able to effect the so much wished-for change. I long as ardently as you can for the moment when we dare to shew ourselves; but it is necessary that every step should be previously agreed upon, that we may be assured that when the blow is struck, it may not fail for want of preparation for every possible event, and that our means may not be uselessly dissipated. Also, that the steps to be taken posterior to the breaking out of the insurrection, should be settled, to prevent all subsequent mistakes, and enable the royalists to profit by the troubles which the republicans would thus excite.—The 2400 livres which I remitted you on the 27th ult. are for your salary up to Feb. 15; but as you may have further occasion for money in case you judge it expedient to quit France, I will send you by the next post a draft for 1200 francs, which will pay you up to the 15th March. I shall not write any thing in the letter which will serve as a cover. As to the sums which I have caused you to receive from the committee, I leave that to your own judgment and that of your associates, being fully persuaded that you will employ them as shall best seem to you at this present moment, for the advancement of your plans. I shall keep B.'s Letter to an Englishman; the packet is too heavy to send by the post, and I shall not forward it till I have a safe conveyance. For the remainder I can print it in Germany.—As to your making a long stay in France, you are at perfect liberty, and I even recommend you to depart the very moment you find your presence no longer necessary. You can go to Off.... from whence you will write to inform me of your arrival, and then continue your journey to Munich. On your arrival here, you must take care to alight directly at my house, and avoid entering the city. You will bring with you all the particulars you can collect, as to the nature of the means your committee have in their power, and all necessary items as to the plan he intends to adopt. I desire you will settle at least three channels for correspondence, not to be at any loss in case that of Toulouze (Strasbourg) should fail. You will certainly not fail to animate your fellow labourers before your departure, giving them a glimpse of the transcendent rewards which they will infallibly receive on the successful result of their projects. Do your utmost endeavours to establish a good correspond-

ence with the officers of the army; and, were it possible, to find 2 or 3 persons in Strasburg whose fidelity might be relied on, that would become extremely useful to us afterwards.—I will see, if possible, to get the seal you mention engraved here: but I believe it will be best to get it done in London.—I believe I have already cautioned you against speaking of the affair to the friend at Off....; he is already apprised that you may possibly return there, and he has been enjoined not to ask you any questions.

No. VIII.—Feb. 14, 1804.—Sir, Here are the 1200 livres I mentioned to you in my last (No. 7.) of 17th Jan. It was utterly impossible to get any bills of exchange at a shorter date; but you will get them discounted at a very easy rate. Since the date of mine, No. 7, received your No. 15 of the 19th Jan., which nevertheless did not come to hand till the 8th Feb. No. 16, of the 30th Jan., and your letter of the same date, both arrived safe the 11th of this month. I will briefly rejoin, as far as they stand in need of answers.—I repeat to you once more, and for the last time, that I have no agency in France excepting your's. As to any of the correspondents I may have there, I am perfectly at ease about them, notwithstanding what you may say as to their probable arrest.—I have no correspondent at Embden; but as copies of your letters are sent to the president, he may, if he thinks proper, take charge of this object at Bourdeaux (London). I have already made your mind easy, as to the attempts of the Consul's emissary at the post-offices in Germany. He will not succeed. But the noise this affair has made, has excited apprehensions in one of my agents in these bureaux, and he desires to be freed from his charge. For this reason, and also to obtain from you a more clear and circumstantial detail (than the bulletins afford) concerning the state of the interior, the extent of your abilities, and the means you intend to make use of, it is, I desire you to set off as soon as possible and come to Off...., and from thence here.—I have already pointed out to you the arrangements you must make for the free circulation of our correspondence in my proceeding, particularly in Nos. 5 and 7.—I recommend you to establish at least two channels of communication, one of which I wish to be Mentz, so as not to be at a loss, in case (as is possible) that of Toulouse (Strasburg) should fail.—The paper upon which you write is excellently adapted to our use; and as it is impossible to find any of it in this country, I desire you to purchase a good stock of it for us both.—The account you gave me of the maritime armaments of the First Consul, and their destination, appears to me of sufficient importance to be sent immediately to Bourdeaux (London); but you have not explained yourself as to the sum the door-keeper asked for the enterprise he proposed to you some time since.—I am very much mortified at the ridiculous apprehensions which appear, according to your account, to be gaining ground in the committee; you must endeavour to dissipate them before you set out; and you may safely declare to your friends in the most solemn manner, that I am totally ignorant of all the circumstances on which they appear founded. In fine, I beg to represent to them, that it will be impossible for me to co-operate efficaciously with them, if they abandon themselves to their suspicions upon every new incident that takes place.—It is not necessary to send me the committee's receipt. It is enough that you bring it with you. I must not omit to remind you to take the necessary precautions on quitting Cha-

lons (Paris) for returning there in case it should at any future time be necessary. I am, &c.

NOTA MANU.

No. IX.—Feb. 25, 1804.—Sir, I received your letter of the 10th on the 21st; and that of the 13th is this moment come to hand. It is highly necessary that you come here as soon as possible, since I cannot give you final instructions without having a previous explanation of several points, which cannot be fully discussed but by word of mouth. Moreover, my man makes a difficulty of conveying the letters; and we shall be obliged to establish the mode of communication which I mentioned to you in my last.—I am acquainted with all the events of the 16th of this month; and it is easy to conceive that the police will keep a vigilant eye on all travellers; of course, you will watch the favourable moment, in order not to incur any risk. It is only through you, that I learn the circumstances relative to Georges, &c.—I have no other knowledge of his projects, than that which your letter furnishes me; but if you possess the means of extricating any of his associates from their difficulties, fail not to employ them. I beseech you earnestly, to have written and printed, at once, a short address to the army (officers and soldiers) exciting them not to suffer Moreau, their fellow-soldier, who has so often led them to victory, to perish, a victim to the rage and the jealousy of the First Consul. You may, in this address, observe, that the merit of Moreau has, for a long time, been offensive to the sight of the petty tyrant; and that the First Consul, to get rid of his rival, has selected the moment of the arrival of the news of the unfortunate fate of St. Domingo, to draw off the attention of the nation from a disaster, singly arising from his bad conduct. You will do well not to lose a moment in making this short address, and to get it circulated among all the armies with the greatest diligence.—I have just written a note to your man of Toulouse (Strasburg) to engage him to place your letters in future, under a cover, addressed to the Abbé Dufresne. In case you write me any more before your departure, I request you to avail yourself of this address, and not to make any more use of the 12 pointed out to you in my letter No. II.—The emissary of whom I have spoken to you, has prevailed upon some underlings of the post-office to promise him to transmit all the news which he could obtain with relation to a correspondence with me, to the following address: "To Citizen Dubois, at the Bureau of the Military Police of the Ministry of War, under cover to Cit. Duroche, grocer, in the street St. Honoré, to . . ."—I could have wished, that you had not taken the step which you mention to me, with the post-master at K...., since it does not appear, that he will be able to be of service to us as long as our correspondence continues as well as it has hitherto done; and I am afraid that it will be impossible to make this opening, notwithstanding all the art and precaution which your man would be able to take, without letting too much escape.—As to the Adj.-general, of whom you speak in your letter of the 13th, I shall be induced to hold a correspondence with him; I shall only place as much confidence in him as is absolutely necessary; but the sum which he asks is not large; and we have the means of ascertaining the truth of his communications. Try then to put this matter in a train before your departure.—As to what you tell me of your plans of operation, I will speak to you more amply when I see you; in the mean time, you may assure your friends that our

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shall not fail to give them the result with all the expedition which the circumstances require.—I can more recommend you to arrange every thing properly, before your departure, which relates to our correspondence. Believe me to be, with the most perfect consideration, Sir. Yours, &c.

NOTA MANUS.

No. X.—Sir,—Since the general (1) shews such confidence in his means; since he thinks that the present moment is singularly propitious for commencing the operations; since he is of opinion that, if we suffer it to escape, such favourable circumstances will not again occur, the friend (2) from hence cannot otherwise than comply with his wishes, and promise him all the assistance which depends on him. The friend must necessarily leave the under-parts of execution to the general on the spot, and who is more interested than any other, that the measures be well prepared and well combined, that the object do not miscarry. He will, nevertheless, observe, that it is of the highest importance, that a place on the frontiers of France and Germany be made sure of as soon as possible, that the friend may have a free, prompt, active, and sure communication with the general, for the transmission of what may become necessary in future. Huningen is the best situated place for it, particularly as it is nearest to the scene of the principal operations.—One must at least establish trusty persons from stage to stage, from Besançon to Friburg, to carry and bring intelligence.—It seems, that the very first operation must be, the seizure of Blois [Besançon] which will serve as an arsenal, and, in case of misfortune, as a place of defence. In this last case, a part of the insurgents might throw themselves on the Cevennes and the mountains of the ancient Vivarais, and maintain themselves there for a long time, provided that care be taken to manage a sure communication for receiving pecuniary succours, whether by way of Huningen, Metz [Basle], or Switzerland. After taking possession of Blois [Besançon], and brought the neighbouring provinces to an insurrection, not a moment must be lost in setting matters also in motion at Châlons [Paris]. Every thing must be previously prepared and disposed for taking advantage there of the first instant of that perplexity and that consternation of the actual Gov., when it learns the movements in the provinces.—Since it is certain, that a very great part of the army, as well officers as soldiers, is discontented with the arrestation of Moreau, it is natural that the general will satisfy them in this respect, in order to assure himself of their aid in the critical moment. The general cannot otherwise than perceive, that it will be of the utmost importance to him, and even of the last necessity, to adopt, as a general principle, the procuring of the assistance of all the disaffected, whoever they may be, and of uniting them all for the first moment, of what party soever, and declaring

(1) It should be observed here, that all which has been written to Mr. Drake on the subject of the general, of which mention is made in the last letter, and with relation to huissier, spoken of in other places, is a pure supposition, as the correspondent himself of Mr. Drake will declare, in the recital, which he purposes to give, on the conversations that he has had at London with the English Minister, and at Munich with Mr. Drake, on the subject of his mission.—(2) The friend is Mr. Drake, who speaks here of himself in the third person.

that the great object of the insurrection being to put an end to the tyranny which weighs on France and on foreigners, all who are enemies of the actual Gov. will be regarded as friends by the insurrectionists; it being moreover very necessary that all the steps be taken with the greatest discretion (particularly towards the partisans of the Consul) in order not to awaken the apprehensions of this great number of persons, who still recollect the ills which they have suffered at different epochas of the revolution. The system may be announced, in the first proclamation, by two words: "Liberty and peace for France, and for the world!" These reflections are particularly recommended to the consideration of the general, while an opposite conduct will not fail to frighten the public in general, and, consequently, to engage the greatest number to unite themselves with the actual Gov., however detestable it is, rather than bring upon themselves a repetition of those revolutionary scenes, the recollection of which is still fresh in their minds.—The friend must also inform the general, that he has obtained the certainty that the arrestation of Moreau has excited a general discontent, and principally in Alsace. This general having a great number of partisans in that country, one might derive great advantage from this dissention, acting on the basis just now indicated.—As to the pecuniary succours, the friend could have wished the general had informed him of what he shall want for the first movements, as well as what may be wanted in future. The friend must inform the general, that this city not being a place of commerce, it is always difficult, and often impossible, to find there bills of exchange on Paris, (particularly bills at a short date) and the friend is almost always compelled to seek them at a great distance from thence when he wants them. The general will then have the goodness to instruct the friend at once how this object may be arranged, by mentioning to him the sums of which he will stand in need, the periods when they must be furnished, by what channel they must be transmitted, and if the remittances must be made in bills of exchange on Paris, or in hard cash. In the latter case, one may send the friend some one that is to be trusted, provided with powers for receiving it, and for carrying it directly either to Châlons [Paris], or to Blois [Besançon], as it may be wanted. But it must be observed, that it will not be possible to amass a very large sum at once, neither in bills nor money: it is very necessary, that it be pointed out as precise as possible the time when money will be wanted, to have time to provide it. As soon as the friend shall receive intimation to this purpose, he will take measures that the sums wanted be deposited with a sure person at Offenburg, at Stutgard, and in some other city near the frontier, who shall deliver them to him whom the general will send—at least if the general shall not deem it proper to point out a person to him, in whom he places an unlimited confidence to a fixed post in one of those cities (or rather at Friburg in the Brigaw) particularly for taking care of this matter, which, perhaps, will be the most convenient plan.—It is to be supposed, that the general will find some funds in the chests of the State, of which he will make himself master; but in the possible case, that it be wanted immediately, before the remittances arrive, bons might be sent, payable to the bearer, at 2 or 3 weeks. The remittances arriving before the day of payment, they shall then be

honoured; and this punctuality of fulfilling these engagements, will not fail to give a great credit to the insurrectionists. There are many circumstances which cannot be discussed in this letter, since one will not detain the traveller any longer, but he shall be told more by word of mouth.—

The general will now receive, by the bearer, the sum of 9,990 francs, making 10,114 livres 17 sous, 6 den. in 4 bills of exchange on Paris, 3 of which are payable the 3d Germinal, and one the 5th. The friend has already taken his measures for procuring the sums which will be wanted in future.—*Munich, March 16, 1804.*—P. S. One may now write to the friend by means of the trusty person at Toulouse [Strasbourg]. The address is to M. l'Abbé Dufresne, Ecclesiastical Counsellor at Munich, in Bavaria.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

DUKE D'ENGHIEN.—It is stated in the foreign papers, and, it is to be feared, but too correctly stated, that the Duke D'Enguieu was shot, in the wood of Vincennes, on the night after his trial, which took place on the 21st of March. It appears, that he was first brought to Paris, from Ettenheim, on the evening of the 20th, in a coach and six, under escort of a party of gens d'armes; that he was carried to the Temple, but was not imprisoned there, an order being given to take him to the castle of Vincennes; that he was so much fatigued as to be scarcely able to keep his eyes open when put upon trial for his life; that he desired to speak with Buonaparté, but was refused; and that, in the presence of several of the republican generals, he met his fate with that courage which has ever belonged to his name.—There were persons who expected, that this gallant prince, the last of the Condés, would have been spared by Buonaparté, if from no other motive, from that of policy: from a desire to have the honour of doing a merciful and magnanimous act, as well as from the fear of exciting the horror and the implacable resentment of the people of France. But, Buonaparté did not fail to perceive, that his clemency would have been attributed to the latter and not to the former motive; that it would, all the world over, and especially amongst the royalists in France, have been ascribed to fear of the effects of that attachment, which the people of France yet entertain for their sovereign and his family; and, that such an opinion would have been extremely injurious to him the Consul must have been convinced. Indeed, the means that were made use of to get possession of the unfortunate prince, clearly showed, that no mercy was to be expected.—The hopes which the "safe politicians" entertain as to the hatred which this deed will excite against Buonaparté, in the hearts of the people of

France, have alas! no other ground than that infatuation and cowardice, which led them to seek for peace and safety, in persecuting those who wished to keep that hatred alive. It is, indeed, shameful, it is scandalous to the last degree, to hear the sentiments, which this description of persons now utter. It is only about thirteen or fourteen months ago, that they were prosecuting a man for endeavouring "to excite, amongst the people of France, hatred of the person and authority of the First Consul;" and they now look for their own safety in the exciting of that hatred; and this they are not ashamed openly to avow! But, they will say, that the difference of our situation justifies this difference of sentiment and of conduct: we were then at peace with Buonaparté, we are now at war with him. Do we, then, ourselves adopt the principle upon which the revolutionists of France acted; the principle that a state of war gives us a right to excite internal hatred against the government and the ruler of the nation with whom we are at war; that hateful principle which the Brissotines promulgated in the decree of November, 1792? Are we, at last, driven to adopt this barbarous principle, and thus to imitate those whose maxims we have so long and so justly reprobated?—The peace changed, with respect to us, the nature of Buonaparté's authority. Till that degrading compact was signed, we had a right to consider him as an usurper, and to endeavour to subvert his power for the purpose of restoring the lawful sovereign; and, we have now an unquestionable right to effect the same object by legitimate war; but, after having acknowledged the legality of his power, after having solemnly entered into bonds of "friendship" with him, after having acted with his co operation in settling the limits and governments of other countries, after this shall we claim the right to act against him in a manner contrary to all the principles which would have regulated our conduct in a war against any other power, with whom we had before been at peace? No: the law of nations, the voice of reason and of justice, say, no. By the peace of Amiens we not only established his power, but we deprived ourselves of the right to question the legitimacy of that power; and, we can never reproach him with being an usurper, without pronouncing our own condemnation, as the "friends" of usurpation. It were curious, indeed, for us to claim the right of considering him as an usurper, and a legitimate ruler, alternately, as it may suit our purpose; yet the claim of the safe politicians amounts to nothing short of this.

They may claim, but the world will not grant; and, to the reputation of cowardice they will now most assuredly add that of perfidy.—Mr. Otto, too, Lord Hawkesbury's worthy friend, our worthy friend Mr. Otto, has, it seems, made his seizure of emigrants, in the capital of the Elector of Bavaria. Well? Was not Mr. Otto drawn through the streets of London in triumph? Was not this mark of attachment to him applauded in the London news-papers? Was not Mr. Otto obliged to go incognito for fear of being hugged and squeezed to death? Did not the ministerial herd fawn upon him like spaniels? Did not the Mayor and Aldermen beslobber him in a manner most disgusting? And, as to emigrants, have not many of them starved to death in St. George's Fields, and did not a member of the last parliament, actually object to the granting of the remaining ones another farthing, in order that they might be furnished into a compliance with the Consul's terms of re-admission? Shall we, then, be suffered undespised to set up our lamentations at the fate of those emigrants, who have fallen into the claws of our amicable friend Mr. Otto? But, did not the makers of the peace and their applauders basely desert the royalists of France? Did not the ministers omit to stipulate in behalf of the gallant remains of the royal and christian army of the west? Did they not even refuse to afford, to those who could have escaped, the means of reaching England and of existing after their arrival? In consequence of this abominable breach of national faith, was not the signing of the peace of Amiens the signal of the murder of all those who had remained faithful to their king and to their engagements with this country, twelve hundred of whom were put to death in the summer of 1802, and were weltering in their blood at the very moment that Lord Hawkesbury was giving dinners upon that service of Porcelaine de Seve which he received as a mark of Buonaparté's friendship? And, is it for us, is it for the safe politicians and their followers; is it for those who made and those who applauded the peace of Amiens, now to bewail the fate of the French emigrants, now to affect an abhorrence of Buonaparté for his severity towards that unfortunate description of men? The fact is this, and a shameful fact it is, that the far greater portion of the sorrow which we hear expressed, on this account, proceeds, not from any attachment to the persons or the cause of the French royalists, but from the conviction, that this country will not be able to derive any further aid from their efforts, that they no longer afford the hope of making a diversion in our fa-

vour, that their discomfiture and their fall deprive us of the means of purchasing protection against the menaced assault of our enemy.—From the circumstance of the execution of the Duke D'Enghuieu having taken place in the night, it has been concluded, that Buonaparté was afraid to execute him by day-light. This seems to have no good foundation. The trial could not have closed much before the hour when the execution is said to have taken place. The time of the execution could have little weight with the people; and, indeed, the opinion that the people of France are at all disposed to favour an act hostile to the Consul is entirely unsupported by any facts that have reached this country. The ruling passion of a Frenchman's breast is the glory of France; the desire to see his country the mistress of the world; and, the only way to sink Buonaparté in the esteem of Frenchmen is to beat him. We may fret and revile and plot and whine as long as we please; we may lament, with Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt, the "apathy and degradation of the powers of the continent," and, in the fullness of our compassion, may weep over the "blindness and servility of the people of France;" but, while the French armies remain in Hanover, and while we ourselves are besieged, however lofty may be our talk, we may rest assured, that the powers of the continent and the people of France will repay our lamentation and compassion with scorn.

MR. DRAKE.—The under-plot, which, from the correspondence to be found in the former part of this sheet, this gentleman seems to have been engaged in, may serve as a tolerable exemplification of the nature and effects of the "safe politician's" system. Mr. Drake appears to be the worthy representative of Lord Hawkesbury, of that "prudent and solid young man," to whom the foreign affairs of this country have been committed, and whom Mr. Pitt chose to describe as second to no man in England, himself and Mr. Fox excepted!—The authenticity of Mr. Drake's letters is questioned by some of the ministerial writers. It will be a pleasing circumstance to find that this doubt has any foundation; but, at present, it appears to have none. Mr. Drake may soon be expected home; for the French will scarcely suffer him to remain at Munich, unless, indeed, they should think it an advantage to keep him in their neighbourhood as a Marplot.—These letters will serve strongly to corroborate the charge, which has been made against England, which will now be implicitly believed all over the Continent, and which belief will

facilitate the project of the French for cutting off a connexion, even of a formal diplomatic nature, between England and the states bordering upon France. It will draw round her another tier of states hostile to us; and, thus, the project of the "safe politicians" will finally have no other effect, than that of sinking our country still lower in the eyes of the world, while it will make the enemy still more secure on the side of the Continent, and leave him nothing to provide for but an attack upon these islands, whenever the time comes, whenever our own financial or other distresses or troubles shall render it favourable, for the making of that attack.

SIERRA LEONE PETITION.—In the preceding sheet will be found a letter upon this subject. I was not unaware, that it would be the duty of government to provide for the Maroons; but, as to the Nova Scotia negroes, they, I believe, were brought away at the special request of the Sierra Leone Company. This matter must, however, be deferred till my next, when I shall have procured such information as will enable me to speak positively as to the terms upon which the negroes of both these classes were delivered over to the Company.

BP. OF LANDAFF'S SPEECH.—It gives me great pleasure to be able to state, upon the best possible authority, that, in the speech, to which I referred in my last, p. 505, the Right Reverend Prelate did not allude to the standing army, and that he is incapable of either speaking or thinking of it with disrespect. This statement will, I am sure, afford the readers of the Register much greater satisfaction than they could have derived from any observations of mine on the sentiment which the newspaper reports represented the venerable Prelate to entertain.—The letter of a correspondent to his lordship, is, of course, now become unnecessary.

CAPTURE OF GOREE.—The ministers, who have long been boasting, that the ports of France are "hermetically sealed," have declared, that they possess no information as to the loss of this colony, which, in the debate of the 11th instant, they took occasion to represent as being of little importance. It is not altogether impossible, that some of them were unacquainted with the very existence of such a colony. They say, that it is our custom to leave the settlements on the coast of Africa unprotected; and, the public will soon be informed by a petition from Liverpool, that the present ministers leave the trade of the West-Indies also unprotected. Nothing can stir out in the wind-

ward islands without being captured by French privateers. As to trade, those islands are nearly blockaded, without costing the enemy a farthing. Privateers, manned with people of all nations, swarm in those seas; and the policy of Lord St. Vincent is, to prevent as much as possible the fitting out of English privateers, without which it is impossible to prevent the depredations of the enemy.

IRISH MILITIA.—Two bills are now before Parliament, one for enabling his Majesty to avail himself of the offers of such regiments of Irish militia, to the amount of 10,000 men, as may volunteer their services to go to any part of Great-Britain, and the other for raising an equal number of Irish militia, to supply the place of those who may be by the former measure removed from Ireland. To remove from the most vulnerable part of the empire ten thousand men who have attained to a certain degree of discipline, merely for the purpose of supplying their place with ten thousand men who have never yet touched a musket, was a project too grossly absurd to be generated in the minds of even the present ministers. It was, therefore, supposed, that this measure was intended as a preliminary step to the introduction of another, namely, the interchange of the British and Irish militias. In consequence of this supposition, a meeting was held, on the 10th instant, at the Thatched-House Tavern, composed of Lords Lieutenants of Counties and Members of Parliament, holding commissions in the militia of Great-Britain, who agreed and published certain resolutions, which will be inserted, at length, in the next number of the Register, and which, after having described the nature of the militia establishment, concluded with stating, "that, even if it were wise and expedient to decide, at this moment, the question of reciprocal service between the militias of Great Britain and Ireland, the magnitude and importance of the question demanded a separate and distinct consideration, and ought not to be introduced into discussion, collaterally and indirectly."—The former of the bills, mentioned above, was discussed in the House of Commons, on the 10th instant, when a division took place, for the bill 130, against it 54; the latter was discussed on the 11th instant, and produced a division of 94 for the bill and 37 against it. In this last debate, the subject of reciprocal service, or interchange of the militias was introduced; Sir John Newport and Mr. Keene declared, that they voted for the former bill only upon the presumption, that it was prefatory to the

further and greater measure of an interchange of militias, and spoke with disapprobation of the resolutions of the Thatched House; but the ministers studiously avoided the subject of interchange, perceiving, perhaps, that it would be difficult to carry such a measure.—What advantage could be hoped for from an interchange of militias it is utterly impossible to conceive, while it might, and would be attended with immediate mischiefs. As a reason for the interchange, it has been said, that the Irish by coming to England will imbibe just notions of civil liberty, by becoming witnesses of the happiness attendant thereon, that they will “be enamoured of industry when they behold the more orderly conduct of the people of England, and the advantages resulting from industrious habits,” and that those Irish who have not the good fortune to come here, will derive very useful lessons of the same sort from the English militia that shall be sent to Ireland! This notion Mr. Fox truly characterized as “romantic;” and, surely, so fanciful a reason for so important a measure never before was urged, in or out of parliament, at the same time that it reflects but little credit either upon the Irish militia, or the people of Ireland. The gentlemen whose invention has furnished them with this argument seem to forget, that it is very likely for the Irish militia to communicate, immediately, some of their habits to the people of England, while, if they should chance to acquire any thing better in exchange, their carrying of that back to Ireland must be matter of very distant hope. And, if we were to allow, that the Irish militia, by coming to England, will imbibe the notions and adopt the habits of the people of England, does it not follow, that the English militia, by going to Ireland, will imbibe the notions and adopt the habits of the people of Ireland? Where, then, are we, in this respect, to look for the advantages of the interchange?—The ministers, however, do not adopt this notion of a migration of armies for the sake of moral improvement, though it is by no means unsuited to that cant with which their professions generally abound. They perceive its absurdity, and rest their defence of the prefatory measure on the pretence of its tending to *augment the disposable force of the United Kingdom*; but how this augmentation is to be effected by picking up ten thousand more men in the militia service, it will puzzle even the ingenious Mr. Yorke to demonstrate, unless by “disposable force” he means such as is capable of being sent any where about the British Islands. Yes; they say, that it will

enable the ministers, when occasion offers, to send abroad more of the regular army than could be otherwise spared. If this be the object, then it must be intended to entrust the safety of Great-Britain altogether to militia and volunteers, for there is but a mere handful of regulars now in it. This a false pretence; obviously so, for, if it were intended to augment the regular army, and if Ireland be the source would it not be better to let the Irish militia remain where they are, and to raise the additional ten thousand men for the regular army?—When the ministers were told, that they were depriving Ireland of disciplined militia men, in order to supply their place with undisciplined militia men, they answered, that, if an emergency arose, they could send to Ireland ten thousand regular troops. Why, then, do they bring the Irish militia away? Is it that we, with all our own militia and 400,000 volunteers, are incapable of defending Great Britain, without the aid of ten thousand Irish militia? Where, then, are we to look for the real cause, the mysterious motive for this measure? It is to be feared, that we must, after all, have recourse to the moralizing reason; for, to suppose that the Irish militia will fight better in defence of England, than in defence of Ireland, would be strange indeed; and, as to their loyalty, that, one would think, must have been more than sufficiently evinced by their spontaneous and gallant offer to extend the limits of their service, and that, too, with no other apparent desire than that of getting as near as possible to the flotillas and lines of the enemy. Besides, the ministers themselves have, it must be allowed, borne ample testimony to the zealous loyalty of the Irish militia; and yet, in the same breath, they propose a measure, whereby Ireland is to be deprived of the exertion of the effect of that noble sentiment. The truth is, that the ministers know not what to do with the Irish militia, or with any other part of the force that has been raised. The army of reserve, which is now to be put a stop to, has not yielded more than 23,000 effective men, though the country has paid more than a million and a half in bounties for that army. The source of recruiting is corrupted and poisoned, the regular army is crumbling away, and, if the war lasts but a few years, there will be nothing left but militia and volunteers.—Another project is on foot for more balloting for the army. That project too will fail. There must be a radical change in the military system, or there will be no soldiers raised. The people will be wearied and disgusted, and peace must be made upon the enemy's own terms,

or the country will be invaded and conquered. We have the means, ample means to preserve our own liberties and to chastise the enemy; but these means are misapplied, they are rendered useless, and, in many instances, are made to turn towards our own destruction.

BIRMINGHAM DOLLARS.—Several tons of dollars are said to have been sent to Birmingham to be metamorphosed by an artizan there, with the intention of being afterwards issued by the Bank of England, with the following words stamped on them: "BANK DOLLARS: TOKEN FOR FIVE SHILLINGS," which, as I observed on a former occasion, will also be a token of *depreciation*. That observation, together with what I had advanced in a preceding sheet, respecting the current rate of the dollar being a proof of the depreciation of the bank paper, has brought me communications from two persons, who either differ with me in opinion, or by whom I have not had the good fortune to make myself understood. — My opinion upon the subject was this: that, as the sterling value of the dollar is no more than 4s. 6d. and as the dollar *now* passes for 5s. in company with English bank paper, that paper is depreciated from its former value ten per centum. I stated this proposition in another way, thus: formerly, only a few years ago, a ten pound bank note would purchase forty four dollars and nearly a half, and that now a ten pound bank note will purchase only forty dollars, of exactly the same weight and metal; from which premises, I naturally drew a conclusion, that the bank note had depreciated. But, according to the first of my correspondents above alluded to, I was in an "error;" for, says he, "the *intrinsic* value of the dollar (or, its exchangeable value in bank notes), is 4s. 9d. and not 5s. as you have stated; and at this price dollars may be purchased of any of the refiners in London." And then he tells me, that the stamped dollars pass for five shillings, only because the Bank promises to take them again at that rate, whenever they may be presented, and that the Bank people have signified this their intention, in a circular letter, which has been sent to most of the bankers and principal merchants in London. He concludes with advising me, as a friend, not to write any more upon the subject, seeing that it is one, which he believes I do not understand.—Now it is rather too hard for this gentleman to impose silence upon me, when he himself allows that dollars, *at the refiner's*, are worth 4s. 9d. in Bank paper, when all the world knows, that they were ten years ago, not worth more than 4s. 2d.

at the refiner's, and 4s. 6d. as sterling money. At any rate the dollar is now worth, in Bank-paper, even at the refiner's, 3d. more than it used to be worth as money. He should have accounted for this rise in the value of the dollar, when matched against paper, before he passed sentence upon me. —But, when did I talk about the price of dollars *at the refiner's*? When did I talk of them but as *currency*? I never spoke of them as bullion, as mere metal. It was not of silver in old buckles or tea-pots that I was talking: it was not of the *intrinsic* value of dollars, but of dollars as *current money* in this kingdom; not of dollars bought and sold for Bank notes, but of dollars acting with Bank notes in the purchase of commodities. In order to simplify my proposition, I did, indeed, make use of the word *purchase*, instead of the words *exchange for*, but, nothing did I say whence any one could reasonably suppose that I meant dollars as bullion. I will now state it in a way which I think no one can possibly miscomprehend. Formerly, forty-four dollars and two shillings would have bought no more bread than a ten pound note would have bought, but now forty dollars will buy as much bread as a ten pound note will buy; if, therefore, the dollars are of the same weight and metal that they used to be, the Bank note must be depreciated.—The objection of my other correspondent has more plausibility. These are his words: "I think the argument, that Bank paper is depreciated, drawn from the difference between the sterling and the current value of a dollar, if it prove any thing, proves too much. That guineas are depreciated you will hardly insist, yet I would sturdily maintain, from your premises, that they are, since a guinea will not purchase so many dollars as it formerly would."—Yes, but I do insist though, that guineas *are depreciated*: not in their intrinsic value, but in their value as *currency*, that is to say in their power of purchasing commodities in this country. When there is a depreciating paper in any country, the current coin of that country depreciates in its powers along with the paper, because it has a fixed nominal value, and it can pass currently for no more than an equal nominal value in paper, until the paper is at an open discount. The metal is degraded by the society of the paper; but, there comes a time when it will bear this degradation no longer; it then rises above its nominal value, or, in other words, the paper is at a discount. Things have arrived at this state in Ireland, where a guinea is worth nearly twenty-three shillings in Bank paper.—To

illustrate this in another way: in America, for instance, where the coins of all countries circulate freely according to their sterling value, an English guinea will purchase as much bread as four dollars and *three* English shillings, but in England, the same guinea will only purchase as much bread as four dollars and *one* shilling. In America and other countries the guinea is not cramped in its powers of purchase by the trammels of a falling paper, and, therefore, it is that the guineas fly to those foreign countries; therefore it is that they leave us; therefore it is, that we scarcely ever see a guinea, and that we never see one except upon its route from the chest of those who can hoard it no longer to the hands of those who are ready to convey it out of the kingdom.—When the paper comes to be publicly at a discount, then more guineas will appear, as they have done already in Ireland, in the northern part of which gold and silver are the common currency. Whether this discount is approaching us, or whether the paper will or can be restored to its sterling value, are questions that I am not now discussing; but, that the paper is in a depreciated state, and that the guineas have, as currency, depreciated along with it, are, I think, positions which can no longer be controverted.—The correspondent first mentioned above has signified his intention to enter at large into the subject of a depreciation in our currency, if I remain unconvinced by his statement; and, as he will perceive, that I do remain so unconvinced, I shall be ready to communicate to my readers any observations that he may think proper to offer for their consideration. I am by no means wedded to my opinions, upon this subject above all others; but, I see nothing holy in the trade of banking any more than the trade of shoe-making, and I shall not, by the whining cant about “decrying the resources of the country,” ever be turned aside from the pursuit of my inquiries. Bank notes are not the resources of the country: the resources of the country consist of men and of the produce of their labour. These existed before Bank notes were heard of, and they will exist when Bank notes shall be no more.

IRISH CURRENCY.—In the preceding number of this work, p. 506, some account was given of the troubles, which had been treated, in Dublin and elsewhere, from the refusal of the bakers and others to take in payment the silver, or rather metal, which has heretofore circulated in Ireland. Mr. Corry, the Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer, has given notice, in Parliament, of a

measure that he proposes to bring forward upon the subject. What this measure may be, it is not easy even to guess. It is hardly intended to make good the promise of Sir Evan Nepean and the cabinet of the Castle; it is hardly intended to send over “dollars and other coin to supply the circulation;” * because, be it known to Mr. Corry, that these dollars and “other coin” would not remain in *circulation* for twelve hours, unless two thirds, at least, of the bank paper were first thrown into the fire, or taken, some how or other, out of circulation. Pure coin cannot, at any thing near its real value, freely circulate in the same atmosphere with that paper. One or the other must give way, and it only remains for the wisdom of Mr. Corry to make his election. It is, by some persons, supposed, that he has determined in favour of the paper; and that, with the advice of the Bank-Directors, it has been determined to issue shilling and sixpenny Bank-notes! Whether these little snips of paper are to be made a legal tender, and whether that measure is to be followed up by the establishing of a *maximum*, as to the prices of labour and provisions, are points to be settled by the cogitations of the Castle; but, let the wise men, to whose hands the government of Ireland has been committed, take care how they move: they are here upon ground more slippery than they ever before trod upon: let them beware how they exercise *their* power; for they may be assured, that no force, civil or military, will, upon this occasion, compensate for the want of wisdom. Above all things let them beware how they make the government a party with the Bank, how they lend to the Bank-paper the aid of the state, for then the Bank-paper becomes assignats at once, and universal distrust and confusion are at no great distance. If small notes are issued, all the necessities of life will *instantly* rise. The pains of death cannot prevent this. Robespierre himself failed in the attempt; and, let the wise men be prepared for those discontents which may arise from the want of a corresponding rise in the price of labour. In short, if they do not act with uncommon prudence and with firmness no less rare, there is now opening before them a gulph of horrors such as even wretched Ireland never yet witnessed.—It is stated, in the public prints, that a full board has assembled, upon this subject, at the Earl of Liverpool's office, and that Sir Joseph Banks, “from his *thorough knowledge*

* See Sir Evan's Letter, p. 507.

"of the coins" was called in to assist the Lords "of the Treasury at this deliberation."—Sir Joseph Banks, above all men living!! Yet, it is very likely, that he may know full as much as the Lords of the Treasury. But, what has "a thorough knowledge of coins" to do with the matter? Foreigners must think we are mad, when they read such passages in our public prints. In what way can the knowledge of a medalist or a mineralogist contribute towards the providing a remedy for the pecuniary evils which now afflict Ireland, and which arise from a derangement in the political œconomy of that country? We shall, however, see what means will be devised by the united wisdom of Lord Hawkesbury, the Doctor, Mr. Bond, and brother Hiley. Events, events, I have repeatedly said, events are rolling on, that will make us *feel* what it is tamely and basely and silently to submit to the rule of such men.—Mr. Corry announced to the Parliament, on the 12th instant, that he should not bring forward his proposition on the subject of the Irish Currency, till the arrival of certain dispatches from Dublin, which dispatches were hourly looked for. Now, what he can expect in these dispatches sufficient to influence him in any measure to be adopted relative to the currency of Ireland, it would puzzle a wizard to discover. In fact, he knows not what to do. It is not a new tax or new loan that he has now to manage: it is not that polite and complaisant set of gentlemen who meet in St. Stephens, that he has now to convince and satisfy: he has now a task of a different nature to perform, and, though he has the immense advantage of Mr. Addington's advice and assistance, he will hardly be able to acquit himself with any tolerable success.—The evil may be got over for a few months very easily; but, it must return, and, at every return, it will acquire new force, till it bursts upon the heads of all those who shall attempt to obstruct the natural course of its operation.—In the midst of all these financial difficulties, where is Mr. Pitt? Where is the "first financier in the world?" Why does he not come and throw upon these dark subjects "the radiance of his luminous mind?" Oh! say his partisans, "he is employed in "the defence of the country!" The defence of the country, indeed! What has he to do, more than other members of Parliament, in the defence of the country? Is what the people in Kent say of him a fact? Is he really bitten by a mad German cor-

poral? Is it, in good earnest, a species of madness which keeps him a volunteering, or does he purposely avoid all discussions in Parliament, except those wherein he can act a part, calculated to preserve his popularity amongst the people, without giving offence at the court? We are informed by his partisan and eulogist, Mr. Ward, that "he laboured by *night* and by *day*, that he "sacrificed his leisure and his health," in making "plans of finance" for Mr. Addington, previous to the misunderstanding between them. Why does he not continue his labours, now that they are wanted more than ever? Will it be said, that it is not his duty, seeing that there is another minister of finance to perform it? So are there, in the ministry, persons whose duty it is to frame and introduce measures relative to the volunteers, the militia, and the army; yet he comes with a whole budget of projects upon these subjects. Here, in a science which he does not, and which he cannot understand, he is full of invention, ready, on all occasions, not only to aid with his advice, but, in the true volunteering spirit, to offer measures ready cut and dry to the hands of the ministers; while, with respect to finance, of which he is said to be the first master in this nether world, he never opens his lips, though a very considerable and very vulnerable portion of the Empire is, perhaps, upon the eve of a convulsion, owing to financial distresses; distresses too, which have arisen out of his own measures. Is this acting a manly part? Is it conduct like this that warrants Mr. Ward's comparison with Camillus and Cato? Is this the man who is to "save the "city and restore the tottering state?" I am deceived if Mr. Ward has not, by this time, begun, like many others, to change his opinion. A name does much; but it will not silence the voice of events, and events are now beginning to speak to us with trumpet-tongues.

It was my wish and intention to have submitted to my readers some remarks on the discussion, which has taken place in Parliament, relative to the *payments made from the Irish Treasury at par*; but want of room compels me to defer these remarks till my next.—The intended *Loans* would also have demanded some attention; and, I cannot even now close this sheet, without begging my readers to recollect Mr. Addington's solemn promise, that "no addition to the debt should be made during the war."